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Abstract 
By questioning whether addressing social inequality can be considered a form of transitional 
justice, this dissertation leads a critical discussion on the assumptions of traditional or narrow 
understandings of transitional justice, how these obscure the potential for transitional justice to 
tackle issues of economic and social rights violations, social inequality and other forms of 
structural violence, and the need for a broad understanding of transitional justice and its key 
components. 
This dissertation addresses the historical and political roots of the field and how these 
influenced a traditional understanding of transitional justice. Thereafter, it traces broadening 
understandings of the concept, evident in the changing meanings of ‘justice’ and ‘transition’ 
and its stated aims. It then considers calls for transitional justice to go beyond its focus on civil 
and political rights violations and to further address economic and social rights violations and 
structural violence, and how these challenge the traditional understanding of the concept. 
Drawing on the distinction between a concept and a conception, and considering transitional 
justice as an effectively contestable concept, this dissertation proposes a broad understanding 
of the concept as the pursuit of justice during a period of social or political transition in order 
to address past injustices and to work towards certain aspirations for the future, comprising of 
the key components of justice, transition, and backwards- and forwards-looking considerations.  
With a primary focus on criminal and restorative justice, civil and political rights, and trials 
and truth commissions, the traditional conception of transitional justice is ill-equipped both 
conceptually and practically to address issues of structural violence. Instead, a conception of 
transitional justice motivated by social or distributive justice is best suited to address social 
inequality and other forms of structural violence. 
Finally, this dissertation considers revolutionary Nicaragua’s attempts to redress social 
inequality in the areas of health, education and housing as an example of transitional justice. It 
is concluded that revolutionary Nicaragua’s concerted effort to address social inequality should 
be considered as a conception of transitional justice inspired by social and distributive justice. 
With growing calls for transitional justice to go beyond its traditional focus on criminal and 
restorative justice, scholars and practitioners stand to learn from previously overlooked 
examples of societies in transition tackling issues of social inequality and other forms of 
structural violence as a matter of transitional justice. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The field of transitional justice has been recognised for its rapid growth and establishment over 
the past 25 years.1 However, fundamental questions surrounding transitional justice – those of 
responsibility, the appropriate means to redress wrongs, and rebuilding following conflict – 
have been addressed throughout history. Quinn draws attention to The Oresteia and Aeschylus’ 
debate over what form of punishment was appropriate for Orestes’ role in the occurrence of 
cyclical violence as evidence of this as early as 500 BC.2 Elster finds questions of transitional 
justice addressed as early as the transition to democracy in Athens in 411 and 403 BC,3 and 
later during the English restoration of the seventeenth century4 and the French restorations 
during the early nineteenth century.5  
The term ‘transitional justice’ found common use only in the early- to mid-1990s,6 and 
established itself as a distinct field after 2000.7 Many scholars trace the emergence of the field 
to the context of the ‘third wave of democratization,’ or the emergence of new democracies in 
Latin America and Central Europe during the 1980s and 1990s.8 After these formative years, a 
‘traditional’ transitional justice and mechanisms associated with it was recognised as:  
[t]he full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) 
                                                 
1 See for example Catherine Turner, “Transitional justice and critique,” in Research Handbook on Transitional 
Justice, ed. Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett, and Dov Jacobs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), 52; Rosemary 
Nagy, "Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections," Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008), 
275; Christine Bell, "Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the Field or Non-Field," International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2008): 6-9. 
2 Joanna R. Quinn, "The development of transitional justice," in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, ed. 
Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett, and Dov Jacobs, Research Handbooks in International Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2017): 12, citing Aeschylus, The Oresteia, (Robert Fagles tr, Viking Press 1975). 
3 Jon Eslter, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press 
(2004): 4-23. 
4 Jon Elster, Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy, ed. Jon Eslter, Cambridge University 
Press (2006): 318. 
5 Eslter, Closing the Books, 24. 
6 Quinn, “The development of transitional justice,” 11; Bell, “State of the Field or Non-Field,” 7. 
7 Bell, “State of the Field or Non-Field,” 7. 
8 Thomas Obel Hansen, "The Time and Space of Transitional Justice," in Research Handbook on Transitional 
Justice, ed. Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett, and Dov Jacobs, Research Handbooks in International Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), 34. The term ‘third wave of democratization’ is attributed to Samuel 
Huntington. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991.  
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and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals, or a combination thereof.9 
The field’s quick ascension and consolidation was not met with unanimity, however, with 
‘considerable debates concerning what transitional justice is or should be’,10 an unease among 
practitioners ‘center[ing] on what the field’s goals are and should be’,11 and critique of its 
mechanisms and their effectiveness. At the forefront of this critique, and the subject of this 
dissertation, is the historic absence and potential role of social justice in transitional justice. 
The neglect of economic and social rights in transitional justice is widely recognised in 
academic literature.12 Conversely, the prioritisation of civil and political rights is also widely 
recognised.13 In response, there have been increasing calls for and debate over the potential of 
transitional justice to address social and economic rights violations, social inequality, and other 
forms of structural issues. 
Within this ‘transitional justice and social and economic justice’ critique of the field, Catherine 
Turner identifies a school of thought consisting of a ‘push in the literature to use the absence 
of economic and social rights within transitional justice discourse and practice as an 
opportunity to challenge the concept of justice that underpins the field.’14 Turner describes this 
school of thought as a ‘much bigger and more ambitious project, concerned with expanding 
the conceptual boundaries of “justice” to include social justice and address structural 
                                                 
9 UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. U.N. 
Doc. S/2004/616. August 23, 2004. 
10 Cheryl Lawther and Luke Moffett, "Introduction - Researching Transitional Justice: The Highs, the Lows and 
the Expansion of the Field," in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, ed. Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett, 
and Dov Jacobs (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), 3. 
11 Bell, “State of the Field or Non-Field,” 6. For further discussion, see Kirsten Ainley, "Evaluating the Evaluators: 
Transitional Justice and the Contest of Values," International Journal of Transitional Justice 11, no. 3 (2017). 
12 See for example, Lars Waldorf, "Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic 
Wrongs," Social and Legal Studies 21 (2012); Dustin N. Sharp, "Interrogating the Peripheries: The 
Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice," Harvard Human Rights Journal 26 (2013); Louise 
Arbour, "Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition," International Journal of Law and Politics 40, 
no. 1 (Fall 2007); Zinaida Miller, "Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the Economic in Transitional 
Justice," International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008); Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan, "Do No 
Harm? Exploring the Scope of Economic and Social Rights in Transitional Justice," International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 8 (September 14, 2014); Frank Haldemann and Rachelle Kouassi, "Transitional Justice 
Without Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?" Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law, 
2014; Amanda Cahill-Ripley, "Foregrounding Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Justice: Realising Justice for 
Violations of Economic and Social Rights," Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 32, no. 2 (2014). 
13 See for example Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past”; Paul Gready and Simon Robins, "From Transitional to 
Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for Practice," International Journal of Transitional Justice 8, no. 3 (2014); 
and Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries”; Roger Duthie, "Transitional Justice, Development, and Economic 
Violence," in Justice and Economic Violence in Transition, ed. Dustin N. Sharp (New York: Springer Nature, 
2014); Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice”; Miller, “Effects of Invisibility”. 
14 Turner, “Transitional justice and critique,” 59-60.  
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inequality.’15 Similarly, Dustin Sharp characterises this as broadening the focus from ‘physical 
violence’, associated with civil and political rights violations to including ‘economic violence’, 
associated with economic and social rights violations.16 Sharp identifies ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
approaches to transitional justice addressing economic violence, with the latter restricting itself 
to addressing violations of economic and social rights during conflict, and the former 
additionally addressing structural violence and social inequality that predates conflict.17 
Scholars have been critical of transitional justice’s failure to address matters of social 
inequality, marginalization, and other consequences of structural violence.18 Nevin Aiken, for 
example, draws on the example of ‘continued post-apartheid presence of deep structural and 
material inequalities between racial groups’ in South Africa as undermining transitional 
justice’s goals of truth, justice, and reconciliation.19 Ismael Muvingi similarly argues that the 
‘exclusion of socioeconomic equity calls into question the very objectives of transitional 
justice.’20 
This dissertation is necessarily concerned with a ‘thick’ approach to transitional justice, or 
where transitional justice addresses social inequality and structural violence predating conflict 
or transition. The reluctance or failure of transitional justice to address socioeconomic issues 
has prompted scholars to call for discussions on the conceptualisation of the field itself,21 and 
others to consider new concepts altogether that may more appropriately address socioeconomic 
issues.22 The ‘traditional’ understanding of transitional justice, as provided above, is contested, 
and the concept of transitional justice itself is the subject of scrutiny and renegotiation.  
As will be discussed in this dissertation, political considerations during transitional justice’s 
formative years were influential in determining how it would be traditionally understood, and 
in its pre-emptive exclusion of considerations of economic and social rights violations, 
structural violence, and social inequality. These political considerations similarly excluded 
                                                 
15 Turner, “Transitional justice and critique,” 59-60. 
16 Dustin N. Sharp, "Introduction: Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition," in Justice and 
Economic Violence in Transition, ed. Dustin N. Sharp (New York: Springer Nature, 2014),785.  
17 Ibid., 803.  
18 For a full discussion, see Chapter 3. 
19 Nevin T. Aiken, "The Distributive Dimension in Transitional Justice: Reassessing the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s Ability to Advance Interracial Reconciliation in South Africa," Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 34, no. 2 (2016): 190-202. For further discussion, see Sharp, “Addressing 
Economic Violence,” 783. 
20 Ismael Muvingi, "Sitting on Powder Kegs: Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional Societies," International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 2 (2009): 165. 
21 Ibid., 164. 
22 For a full discussion on Transformative Justice, see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2, and Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3. 
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revolutionary Nicaragua and their efforts to redress social inequality as a case of transitional 
justice. Where pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was characterised by a state of absolute poverty 
and inequality, revolutionary Nicaragua saw ‘tremendous progress […] in meeting the needs 
of the masses’, with accomplishments in health, education, housing, and welfare specifically 
recognised.23 These initiatives were a concerted effort to address the social injustices of the 
past during the country’s transitional period.  
1.2 Research Question 
In light of the above, this dissertation will inquire into the meaning of transitional justice and 
its potential to address social inequality by exploring the following research question:  
Could redressing social inequality be considered a form of transitional justice? 
This research question can be usefully divided into two sub-questions, which will be 
addressed in this dissertation:  
Sub-question one: How can transitional justice be defined as a concept? 
Sub-question two: Is redressing social inequality a form of transitional justice?  
In order to ground this theoretical discussion with a practical example, an additional sub-
question will also be addressed:  
Sub-question three: Could revolutionary Nicaragua’s attempts to redress social inequality be 
considered a form of transitional justice? 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology of this paper draws on the distinction between a concept and its varying 
conceptions, and the understanding that a concept may be effectively contestable. This 
approach has been used by Andrew Schaap in his rebuttal to the objection that reconciliation 
is too broad or vague to be a distinct concept. Schaap distinguished between a non-
controversial concept of reconciliation and its many conceptions, which ‘emerge in public 
debates about how it might be achieved, what “real” or “true” reconciliation would require’,24 
                                                 
23 Harvey Williams, "The Social Impact in Nicaragua," in Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War, 
ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1987), 247. 
24 Andrew Schaap, "Reconciliation as Ideology and Politics," Constellations15, no. 2 (2008): 250. 
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concluding that reconciliation as a political concept is effectively contestable. In a similar vein, 
this dissertation will approach transitional justice as an effectively contestable concept and 
consider whether addressing social inequality is a form or conception of transitional justice. 
An understanding of transitional justice as an effectively contestable concept is fundamental to 
the methodology of this dissertation. A concept is effectively contestable when ‘its 
contestability is not an essential property of the concept but a property of political discourse’ 
and that contestability is ‘effectively ineliminable’.25 Michael Freeden provides three 
arguments for viewing concepts as effectively contestable. Firstly, drawing on the adage 
‘history does not repeat itself,’ he argues that the ‘circumstances of non-trivial political choice-
making will never be identical and the world of politics does not remain constant.’ Secondly, 
Freeden applies the above lesson to context, arguing that the context in which a concept finds 
itself is subject to inevitable and unpredictable change. Accordingly, effective contestability 
concedes that ‘we cannot conceive […] of the impossibility of conferring on a political 
discourse a new reading, or a reading that is not identical to any previous one.’26 Finally, 
Freeden recalls that a ‘central feature of political discourse is the construction of ambiguity’.27  
Viewing a concept as effectively contestable allows for political discourse and challenges a 
regulated consensus of the concept. In our case, the political discourse around what transitional 
justice is, what its goals are, and how it should achieve these, manifests as varying conceptions 
of the concept of transitional justice.  
Before attempting to address a conception of transitional justice, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of a concept of transitional justice, detached from the ongoing political discourse 
surrounding its meaning. To this end, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic approach to 
conducting a conceptual analysis of transitional justice as a concept. A conceptual analysis 
seeks to discover the ‘elements a concept is composed of and how these elements are related.’28 
A pragmatic approach to conceptual analysis ‘would consist in uncovering the most salient 
features of the concept: those that figure most prominently in an explanation of the kind of 
thing it is the concept of—that are central to our understanding and appreciation of it’.29 This 
                                                 
25 Michael Freeden, "Editorial: Essential Contestability and Effective Contestability," Journal of Political 
Ideologies 9, no. 1 (2004): 5. 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009), 127. 
29 Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal 
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approach is necessary as it accommodates a concept of transitional justice that is effectively 
contestable and conducive to political discourse. 
This author is aware of Giovanni Sartori’s warning over conceptual stretching – the broadening 
of the meaning of a concept as it is applied to new cases and the resultant ‘vague’ and 
‘amorphous’ concepts.30  Writing at a time of expansion of the field of political science and the 
proliferation of political systems in the mid to late twentieth century,31 Sartori recognised the 
need for ‘universal’ categories or ‘concepts which are applicable to any time and place’,32 
however was wary of concepts lacking limitations or clear definitions.33 In his own words: ‘[i]n 
order to obtain a world-wide applicability the extension of our concepts has been broadened 
by obfuscating their connotation’ or ‘by reducing the number of qualifying attributes’.34  
Sartori’s critique, however, presumes a concept as being ‘previously defined and refined’.35 As 
discussed above, and as further addressed in this dissertation, there is significant discord, 
debate, and political discourse in the field of transitional justice, with the concept itself under 
scrutiny and subject to renegotiation. To presume transitional justice as previously defined and 
refined would be antithetical to the ongoing political discourse in the field. As Thomas Hansen 
posits, we ‘cannot speak of transitional justice in a static and uniform sense’.36 
1.4 Chapter Outline  
In addition to this introductory Chapter, this dissertation consists of three main chapters and a 
conclusion. 
Chapter Two first provides an overview of the roots and political considerations behind the 
field of transitional justice and how it is traditionally understood. Thereafter it seeks to gain an 
understanding of the current state of the field, with a focus on how the ‘transition’ and ‘justice’ 
of transitional justice have come to be understood more broadly. Having provided an overview 
of both traditional and emerging understandings of the concept, it is argued that transitional 
                                                 
Theory (Oxford University Press, 2001), 179. 
30 See generally, Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," The American Political 
Science Review 64, no. 4 (December 1970). 
31 Ibid., 1034. 
32 Ibid., 1035. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 1051, 1053. 
35 Ibid., 1033-34. 
36 Thomas Obel Hansen, “The time and space of transition,” 34-51. 
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justice is best understood as an effectively contestable concept. This in turn informs a 
pragmatic conceptual analysis of transitional justice which identifies its key components.  
Chapter Three first provides a review of select readings in transitional justice literature 
regarding the inclusion of economic and social rights and issues of structural violence in 
transitional justice’s scope, including the varying degrees to which it is argued these should or 
should not be included. The Chapter then addresses the continued exclusion of matters of 
structural violence and social inequality despite calls for the inclusion of economic and social 
rights, and the causes for this. Finally, with the understanding of transitional justice and its key 
components as proposed in Chapter 2, this Chapter considers whether addressing social 
inequality could be considered a form of transitional justice. 
Chapter Four considers revolutionary Nicaragua (1979 to 1982) and its attempts to redress 
social inequality as an effort to advance transitional justice. A brief introduction canvases 
Nicaragua’s brief mention in transitional justice literature and provides the historical 
background necessary for the inquiry. The Chapter then addresses revolutionary Nicaragua’s 
initiatives in the areas of health, education and housing, and considers how these may be 
considered a form of transitional justice. The purpose of this chapter is to ground the theoretical 
inquires of Chapters Two and Three with a practical example of addressing social inequality 
as a conception of transitional justice.  
Finally, Chapter Five concludes with an overview of key points and final thoughts.  
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Chapter Two: Transitional Justice and its Conceptions 
2.1 Introduction 
The lack of consensus on a meaning of transitional justice has proven insurmountable for over 
a decade.37 However, between the field’s formative years, characterized by hotly contested 
questions of how to achieve justice during times of transition and its current state of contest 
over meaning, transitional justice enjoyed a period of marginal consensus. Transitional justice 
experienced a ‘dramatically compressed trajectory of fieldhood’, consolidating itself as a 
distinct field in the early 2000s, and by 2009 becoming ‘a broad, multidisciplinary field that 
subjects its own origins, assumptions and political significance to radical critique.’38 It is during 
the field’s consolidation in the early 2000s that it experienced a period of marginal consensus, 
with noteworthy definitions capturing the traditional understanding of transitional justice.  
Building off her earlier work, Ruti Teitel proposed a definition of transitional justice in her 
2003 article Transitional Justice Genealogy,39 defining transitional justice as: ‘the conception 
of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to 
confront the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes.’40 Following a year later, through 
the United Nations’ official endorsement of the field in 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan defined transitional justice as: ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated 
with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.’41 These definitions reflect the 
                                                 
37 See for example, Alexander L. Boraine, "Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation," Journal of 
International Affairs 60, no. 1 (Fall 2006): 17; Bell, "State of the Field or Non-Field," 6; Pablo De Greiff, 
"Theorizing Transitional Justice," Transitional Justice 51 (2012): 32; Lawther and Moffett, "Introduction - 
Researching Transitional Justice,” 3; Alana Tiemessen, "International Justice Scholars and Advocates: One Big 
Happy Principled Family?" Duck of Minerva (blog), June 6, 2011; Jens D. Ohlin, "On the Very Idea of 
Transitional Justice," Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Spring 2007, 51; Ainley, "Evaluating the Evaluators,” 
423; Paige Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,"Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009):  359. 
38 Bell, “State of the Field or Non-Field,” 7. Dustin Sharp describes the field’s accelerated growth as ‘nothing 
short of remarkable’. Sharp, "Addressing Economic Violence,” 2. Fletcher and Weinsten noted the maturation of 
transitional justice literature in the 2000s, also observing a ‘sharp upstick in 2003’, see L. E. Fletcher and H. M. 
Weinstein, "Writing Transitional Justice: An Empirical Evaluation of Transitional Justice Scholarship in 
Academic Journals," Journal of Human Rights Practice 7, no. 2 (2015): 179.  
39 Ruti G. Teitel, "Transitional Justice Genealogy," Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003); Ruti G. 
Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
40 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 69. 
41 UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. U.N. 
Doc. S/2004/616. August 23, 2004. 
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traditional understanding of transitional justice that is the subject of scrutiny by scholars and 
practitioners today.42  
With the field finding a brief period of consensus to develop this traditional understanding of 
transitional justice, it begs the question as to why consensus around these definitions have 
deteriorated to such an extent. Scholars have cited ‘confusion’43 and ‘unease’44 when 
characterising the state of the field, describing it as a ‘web of tangentially connected practices 
and philosophies’,45 at a ‘crossroads’,46 and the concept itself ‘an enigma’.47  
A significant challenge to the concept stems from recognition of the field’s prioritization of 
civil and political rights (CPR) to the neglect of economic and social rights (ESR) and issues 
of structural violence,48 calling into question the legitimacy of the practice itself.49 This state 
of confusion and disagreement leaves the concept of transitional justice open for renegotiation 
and reconceptualization.50 Therefore, prior to considering whether addressing social inequality 
is a form of transitional justice, it is necessary to establish a clear understanding of transitional 
justice as a concept in the midst of the confusion. 
In order to account for the lack of consensus in the field and to come to an understanding that 
can be agreed upon, it is necessary to acknowledge the historical and political roots that 
influenced traditional understandings of transitional justice. Looking at transitional justice’s 
                                                 
42 Teitel’s definition has been characterized as ‘narrow’, ‘traditional’, ‘classic’ and ‘legalistic’. See for example, 
Simon Robins, "Failing Victims? The Limits of Transitional Justice in Addressing the Needs of Victims of 
Violations.," Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 11, no. 1 (2017): 42; Schmid and Nolan, "Do No 
Harm?” 380; Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence,” 6; For further discussion on narrow transitional justice, 
see Haldemann and Kouassi, "Transitional Justice Without Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?" 2; Kieran 
McEvoy, "Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice," Journal of Law and 
Society 34, no. 4 (December 2007): 164; Cahill-Ripley, "Foregrounding Socioeconomic Rights in Transitional 
Justice,” 187. 
43 Boraine, “Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation,” 17. 
44 Bell, “State of the Field or Non-Field,” 6. 
45 Quinn, "The development of transitional justice," 15. 
46 Vasuki Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice: Looking Back, Moving Forward, Research Report, Impunity 
Watch, May 2016, 11. 
47 Ohlin, "On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice," 51. 
48 See for example, Waldorf, "Anticipating the Past"; Sharp, "Interrogating the Peripheries”; Arbour, "Economic 
and Social Justice”; Miller, "Effects of Invisibility”; Schmid and Nolan, ‘’Do No Harm?”; Haldemann and 
Kouassi, "Transitional Justice Without Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?"; Cahill-Ripley, “Foregrounding 
Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice”; Roger Duthie, " Transitional Justice, Development, and 
Economic Violence"; Gready and Robins, "From Transitional to Transformative Justice”. 
49 See for example, Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 5. 
50 See for example, Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence,” 790; Bell, “State of the Field or Non-Field,” 27; 
Schmid and Nolan, ‘’Do No Harm?” 379; Haldemann and Kouassi, "Transitional Justice Without Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights?" 2; Cahill-Ripley, “Foregoing Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice,” 185; 
Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 11-12. 
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growth from the early years of the Nuremberg Trials through its formative years in the 1980s 
and 1990s and to its consolidation in the early 2000s reveals the significance of a Western 
liberal agenda, a growing international criminal justice regime and international 
institutionalism that shaped how the concept would be traditionally understood. These political 
roots determined the way in which the transition, justice, and backwards- and forwards-looking 
components of transitional justice would be defined and are central to the reason behind the 
field’s neglect of ESR and unwillingness to directly address structural violence. By failing to 
account for these roots, adopting a traditional understanding of transitional justice prevents the 
consideration of alternative accounts of societies in transition addressing the past as potential 
examples of transitional justice, including the case of revolutionary Nicaragua in the early 
1980s, and the opportunity to learn from such experiences. Accounting for these political roots 
and coming to a broad understanding of transitional justice is a first step towards considering 
revolutionary Nicaragua’s efforts to address structural violence as an example of transitional 
justice. 
To this end, the following section provides a brief overview of the history of the field of 
transitional justice and considers how the political considerations of these roots influenced the 
‘traditional’ understanding of the concept. The following section traces the field’s broadening 
from its roots through the changing meanings of ‘transition’ and ‘justice’, and addresses how 
the choice of mechanisms has been resilient to change. Finally, the field’s broadening in 
meaning and scope informs a pragmatic conceptual analysis of transitional justice and the key 
components that make it a distinct concept. This Chapter answers the question, ‘How is 
transitional justice defined as a concept?’. 
2.2 Traditional Transitional Justice and its Historical and Political Roots  
2.2.1 Brief History of Transitional Justice 
Fundamental questions surrounding transitional justice have been addressed as early as 500 
BC,51 and measures currently associated with the practice have been used as far back as 2,000 
                                                 
51 Quinn, “The development of transitional justice,” 12, citing Aeschylus, The Oresteia, (Robert Fagles tr, Viking 
Press 1975); Eslter, Closing the Books, 4-24; Elster, Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy, 
318; Lauren Marie Balasco, "The Transitions of Transitional Justice: Mapping the Waves From Promise to 
Practice," Journal of Human Rights 12, no. 2 (2013): 199. 
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years ago.52 Despite these historic accounts however, scholars locate the origins of the current 
field in the twentieth century, with the most formative years in the latter two decades. 
In her highly influential article, Teitel identified three phases in the history of transitional 
justice,53 which have since been expanded and elaborated on.54 Considered a prelude to the 
first phase, the post-World War I period  saw the ‘origins of modern transitional justice’ as 
deliberations were held around the appropriate form of administering justice for German 
aggression.55 Teitel believes the experiences (or more aptly, failures) of post-World War I 
attempts to deter the outbreak of conflict through the administration of collective sanctions and 
punitive justice informed transitional justice efforts after the Second World War.56 These 
lessons ushered in the first phase, or the post-Second World War period. In this phase, national 
trials gave way to international criminal accountability, and collective punishment gave way 
to ‘individual judgement and responsibility’ for Nazi Germany’s crimes.57 The primary 
normative aim of this phase was the establishment of rule of law and accountability, achieved 
through the administration of international criminal justice,58 and was characterized by 
‘interstate cooperation, war crimes trials, and sanctions’.59  For Vasuki Nesiah, this phase was 
characterized as ‘relatively heterogenous and experimental’. 60 
Teitel’s second phase begins with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘veritable wave of 
political transition’ that followed.61 These political shifts, understood as transitions to 
democracy, are noted by Paige Arthur as ‘the crucial new developments of the 1980s’.62 
Indeed, most scholars identify the emergence of new democracies in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe during the 1980s and 1990s as the formative years of transitional justice.63 In Latin 
                                                 
52 Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,”327, citing Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance 
(reviewing the history of war crimes tribunals over the past 200 years) and Jon Elster, Justice in Historical 
Perspective (tracing accounts of trials and purges as far back as 2,000 years ago).  
53 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy.” 
54 See for example Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice; Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries”.  
55 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 72. 
56 Ibid., 72-73. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 73. 
59 Ibid., 70. 
60 Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 7. 
61 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 75-76. See also, Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 7. 
62 Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,” 336. 
63 Ibid., 324, 326; Hansen, "The Time and Space of Transitional Justice," 34; International Center for Transitional 
Justice, Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Societies, ed. Roger Duthie and 
Paul Seils (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017): 5; Sharp, “Interrogating the 
Peripheries,” 153; Balasco, "The Transitions of Transitional Justice,” 199-200; Nesiah, Transitional Justice 
Practice, 7. 
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America, successor regimes were confronted by questions of how to deal with past 
authoritarian regimes and ‘repressive military juntas’, and dilemmas associated with these – 
namely, determining to what extent accountability through criminal or retributive justice 
should be pursued at the risk of jeopardizing the maintenance of peace.64 
In response to this dilemma, criminal justice and the pursuit of accountability was 
complimented by restorative justice and the goal of constructing ‘an alternative history of past 
abuses’,65 and the restoration of relations between people and communities. The shift to 
restorative justice, primarily pursued through truth commissions in lieu of trials and 
prosecutions,66 demonstrated the second phase’s goal of maintaining peace rather than the 
pursuit of justice.67 Similar efforts can be noted in South Africa, where the establishment of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the exchange of amnesty for truth, and limited 
prosecutions were considered viable alternatives to ensure a peaceful transition. 
This phase also faced certain conceptual challenges. For Teitel, the incorporation of restorative 
justice in the transitional justice process generated problematic dichotomies which undermined 
rule of law standards: regarding the use of truth commissions in lieu of trials and prosecution, 
a conflict between truth and justice;68 regarding a ‘jurisprudence of forgiveness and 
reconciliation’ motivated by the pursuit of peace, a conflict between peace and justice.69 For 
Nesiah, transitional justice’s individualistic focus on physical violence failed to address more 
systemic issues and victims thereof, creating a disconnect between the advancement of 
international law and human rights activism and victims of systematic abuses.70 Thus, the 
second phase was characterized by the field’s formation and rapid growth, but also by 
challenges to how transitional justice should be put into practice. 
Writing at the turn of the century, Teitel characterized the third phase as ‘steady-state 
transitional justice’, 71 where transitional justice ‘move[d] from the exception to the norm’ and 
became central in international policymaking during transition, a notion Sharp believes 
                                                 
64 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 75. (‘Peace’ here refers to the conception of peace as ‘negative peace’). 
65 Ibid., 78. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 79-80. 
68 Ibid. 78. 
69 Ibid., 81-82. 
70 Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 8-9.  
71 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 89-90. 
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confirmed by the UN Secretary General’s official endorsement of transitional justice.72 Indeed, 
transitional justice would come to be described as a ‘global project’73 and a ‘global 
enterprise’.74 Nesiah saw the field’s consolidation as ‘narrow[ing] the field of experimentation 
and mobiliz[ing] a normative model of transitional justice’, and a rallying of scholars and 
practitioners around the ‘pillars of transitional justice’, including prosecutions, truth 
commissions, reparations and institutional reform. It is during this phase that the field found a 
period of marginal consensus, allowing a traditional understanding of transitional justice to 
galvanize. 
Finally, Nesiah and Sharp fill the gap since Teitel’s article by recognising a fourth and current 
phase of transitional justice. Sharp characterizes the current phase by a growing concern over 
issues that sit at the ‘periphery’ of transitional justice, including ‘the need to account for the 
underlying politics of transitional justice work, the need to balance local and international 
agency, and the need for greater economic justice.’75 In a similar vein, Nesiah believes the most 
contentious issue relates to ‘whether the field should be defined in terms of institutions […], 
or whether those institutions should be situated as avenues to deeper socio-political 
transformation’, including the question of addressing economic crimes and structural 
violence.76  Thus, the current phase of transitional justice is characterized by challenges to its 
traditional understanding, including calls for ESR concerns and structural violence to be 
addressed. 
2.2.2 The Political Roots of the Field 
While Teitel’s genealogy provides a useful overview of the history and progression towards a 
traditional understanding of the concept, it does not problematize the inherent political nature 
of transitional justice and the assumptions of its traditional understanding, and does not explain 
revolutionary Nicaragua’s exclusion as an example of transitional justice. 
                                                 
72 Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries,” 156, citing UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. 
73 Nagy, "Transitional Justice as a Global Project”. 
74 Miller, "Effects of Invisibility,” 1. 
75 Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries,” 157. 
76 Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 11-12 (Nesiah does not expressly mention structural violence, however 
her reference to ‘structures that sustain the on-going disempowerment of victims and other marginalized 
communities’ alludes to it). 
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In her effort to locate the origins of the field, Arthur investigated the emergence and acceptance 
of the term ‘transitional justice’.77 While finding earlier mentions and attributing authorship, 
amongst others, to Teitel, Arthur credits editor Neil Kritz with the widespread transmission 
and acceptance of the term.78 Kritz completed the mammoth task of compiling literature on 
‘the way that emerging democratic societies address the legacies of their repression of their 
own people’.79 Kritz’s work and his understanding of transitional justice was highly influential 
in how transitional justice would come to be defined. For Arthur, the transmission and 
acceptance of the term transitional justice is attributable to Kritz given the few instances the 
term was referenced by scholarly journals in 1994 as opposed to its more frequent reference by 
2000, and the acceptance of the ‘utility of the term itself [and] the contents of the term 
proposed’ by reviewers of his work.80 Kritz’s influence is similarly recognised by other 
scholars - Balasco considers Kritz’s work the ‘high point of [the] explorative era’ of transitional 
justice during the 1980s and 1990s,81 while Teitel cites his work as a ‘helpful compilation’ of 
transitional justice while proposing a definition for the term.82  
Kritz’s work reveals a key political consideration that shaped traditional understandings of 
transitional justice, namely the goal of promoting Western style democracy in states emerging 
from authoritarianism. That Kritz envisioned ‘transition’ as a transition to democracy is made 
clear by the title of his voluminous account of transitional justice – Transitional Justice: How 
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes – and is stated in clear terms.83 
Democratic reform was a ‘stated goal of important segments of the population in countries 
undergoing political change’ during the formative years of transitional justice,84 and for Kritz, 
transitional justice could establish democracy and the rule of law - ‘the very principles that 
[would] hopefully distinguish the new regime from the old’.85 At the base of these aims is what 
                                                 
77 Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,” 327-33. 
78 Ibid., 329. (Arthur discusses Timothy Garton Ash as a notable exception to the acceptance of Kritz’s notion of 
transitional justice. Ash’s critique primarily centered around the narrowness of the proposed notion.) 
79 Charles D. Smith, "Introduction,” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes, Volume I - General Considerations, vol. 1, ," ed. Neil J. Kritz (United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 
xviii, [emphasis in original]. 
80 Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,” 331. 
81 Balasco, "The Transitions of Transitional Justice,” 200. 
82 Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,”’ note no. 3. For further examples, see Wendy Lambourne, 
"Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence," International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 
1 (2008): Footnote no. 4; Stef Vandeginste, "Transitional Justice for Burundi: A Long and Winding 
Road," Building a Future on Peace and Justice, 2009, Footnote no. 1. 
83 Smith, "Introduction," in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 
xviii. 
84 Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,” 337. 
85 Smith, "Introduction," in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, xxi.  
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Sharp describes as a ‘Western liberal paradigm undergirding the birth of the field of transitional 
justice’,86 an observation bolstered when noting that Kritz’s work was only reviewed by 
Western institutions – the vast majority in the United States, and only one in Europe.87  
Arthur elaborates on the origins of transitional justice as rooted in a Western paradigm, finding 
the term ‘transition’ in political discourse originally conceptualized by Marxists to describe 
social transformations, or ‘changes at the structural level of society and economy’.88 As a 
response to a global ideological shift away from the left in the 1970s and 1980s, however, the 
term was repurposed by political analysts who ‘recast it in terms of political reform, rather than 
social transformation’.89 The object of this political reform or transition, and the goal of 
traditional transitional justice, was the establishment of a Western style democracy. With the 
role of transitional justice envisioned as promoting political reform, a focus on CPR developed 
instead of a focus on addressing the ESR necessary for social transformation.90 Cold War 
politics prevented addressing such concerns ‘given the high political price of appearing too 
sympathetic to their communist causes’,91 and was largely the reason for why revolutionary 
Nicaragua’s transition from authoritarianism to democratic socialism was not considered to be 
transitional justice. 
In order to advance accountability and establish the rule of law necessary for a Western liberal 
democracy, transitional justice pursued criminal or retributive forms of justice, or those forms 
‘generally associated with legal trials in the Western legal justice system.’92 These forms of 
justice, primarily achieved through trials or prosecutions, secured the dominance of legalism 
over the field,93 along with a ‘longstanding legalistic bias’94 for a prioritization of CPR,95 
                                                 
86 Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries,” 149. See also, Nagy, "Transitional Justice as Global Project,” 275. (Nagy 
similarly characterizes transitional justice as a ‘[s]teeped in Western liberalism’.) 
87 For a full discussion, see Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,” 330-31. 
88 Ibid., 338. 
89 Ibid., 338-339. 
90 The division of these rights as a consequence of Cold War politics is reflected in the signing of two separate 
international convention of rights: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See for example, OHCHR, “Key concepts on ESCRs - Are 
economic, social and cultural rights fundamentally different from civil and political rights?.”  
91 Lisa J. Laplante, "Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic 
Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework," International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 
(December 1, 2008): 335, citing Richard Asby Wilson, “Is the Legalization of Human Rights Really the Problem? 
Genocide in the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission,” in The Legalisation of Human Rights: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights and Human Rights Law, ed. Saladin Mechled-Garcia and Basak 
Cali (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
92 Lambourne, "Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” Footnote no. 6 
93 For full discussion, see McEvoy, "Beyond Legalism”. 
94 Waldorf, "Anticipating the Past,” 173. 
95 See Cahill-Ripley, “Foregoing Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice,” 188. 
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concerns of violations of physical or bodily integrity (i.e., murder, rape, torture and forced 
disappearance)96 and physical violence.97 As will be discussed in Chapter Three, transitional 
justice’s focus on these forms of justice, the dominance of legalism, and the consequential 
prioritization of CPR has been to the detriment of ESR concerns, including demands to address 
structural violence and social inequality.  
This traditional understanding of transitional justice was consolidated, institutionalized and 
internationalized from the early 2000s onwards. Transitional justice and its ‘pillars’ were 
increasingly called upon by UN bodies and international NGOs to facilitate transitions,98 and 
a focus on criminal justice was secured by the founding of the International Criminal Court 
and various special tribunals to address past injustices in transitional societies.99 For many 
scholars, the field’s consolidation distanced transitional justice from the societies it served as 
it became increasingly internationalised, with Western countries enjoying a monopoly of the 
field.100 The narrow or traditional understanding of transitional justice, informed by unique 
experiences of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America, was standardized and offered as a 
solution to societies undergoing transition in different parts of the world without accounting 
for local context or demands.101 A focus on addressing issues of physical violence through 
criminal justice was also consolidated in the traditional understanding of transitional justice, 
leaving issues of economic and social rights violations (ESRV) and structural violence 
unaddressed, thereby entrenching past inequality into the future and restricting opportunity for 
social change during transition.102  
While the Cold War has ended, political considerations that influenced transitional justice are 
much alive in how it is traditionally understood today. A Western agenda of establishing liberal 
democracy in countries emerging from authoritarianism influenced key components of 
                                                 
96 Dustin N. Sharp, "Emancipating Transitional Justice from the Bonds of the Paradigmatic 
Transition," International Journal of Transitional Justice 9, no. 1 (2014): 160. 
97 Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence,” 785. 
98 Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 10 (recognises the ‘pillars’ as prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations and institutional reform); Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries,” 156; UN Secretary-General, The Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies. 
99 For further discussion, see for example, McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 421; Sharp, “Interrogating the 
Peripheries,” 156; Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 10. 
100 Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 13-18. See also, McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 425, citing Paul Gready, 
"Analysis: Reconceptualising Transitional Justice: Embedded and Distanced Justice," Conflict, Security & 
Development 5, no. 1 (2005): 2-21. 
101 For further discussion, see Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries,” 170, citing James Cavallaro and Sebastian 
Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in 
Transitional Justice from Below, Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change, eds. Kieran McEvoy and 
Lorna McGregor, 2008: 122. 
102 For further discussion, see Nesiah, Transitional Justice Practice, 10-11. 
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transitional justice, namely: that the term ‘transition’ entails a transition to democracy; that 
justice is primarily associated with its criminal or retributive forms, and secondarily with its 
restorative form; that the normative aims are primarily the establishment of democracy, the 
rule of law, and the pursuit of accountability, and secondarily, the pursuit of truth and 
reconciliation; and finally, the understanding that these normative aims and demands for justice 
are best pursued through a particular set of mechanisms, namely prosecutions or trials, truth 
commissions or commissions of inquiry, reparations and institutional reform. 
As mentioned above, while transitional justice and its traditional understanding managed to 
find marginal consensus, this narrow understanding is increasingly being challenged. As the 
following section will show, the ‘transition’ and ‘justice’ components of transitional justice, 
which past injustices it is called upon to address and which aspirations it is called upon to 
pursue have come to be understood differently than the traditional understanding reviewed 
above. That transitional justice is open to multiple understandings suggests it may be 
understood as a contestable concept, where its key components may be understood or valued 
differently. The reason for the lack of consensus on transitional justice, then, is due to 
perpetuating assumptions inherited from the Western liberal agenda during the field’s 
formative years within the traditional understanding of transitional justice that clash with new 
demands and expectations. Writing of her account on the emergence of transitional justice, 
Sharp believes Arthur was ‘exploring the idea that if paradigmatic political transitions of the 
1980s and 1990s had been conceived of as transitions to socialism, the scope, focus, and 
modalities of transitional justice might look quite different today.’103 If consensus on an 
understanding of transitional justice is to be found, it should shed the political assumptions of 
a Western liberal agenda, and rather be defined in a manner open to various understandings. 
2.3 Broadening of Transition Justice 
Many scholars recognise that transitional justice has broadened from the roots of the field.104 
In order to provide an overview of the field’s broadening, the following section looks at the 
changing meaning of ‘transition’ and ‘justice’ within transitional justice discourse. This 
approach – ‘unpacking the justice and transition components’ – has been similarly employed 
                                                 
103 Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries,” Footnote no. 3, citing Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human 
Rights,” 325-26. 
104 See for example, Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights,” 326; Sharp, “Addressing Economic 
Violence,” 782-783; Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice,” 2, 26-27. 
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by various scholars working to understand transitional justice,105 and demonstrates how 
transitional justice and its key components are flexible and open to varied understandings.  
2.3.1 Changing Meaning of Transition 
As the field has broadened from its roots it has taken on alternative understandings of the 
meaning of transition. Alexander Boraine offers a broadened understanding of transition as: ‘a 
country which is emerging from one particular order and is uncertain and unsure as to how to 
respond to the challenge of the new’.106 Hansen identifies the growth of transitional justice 
literature on situations of transition from armed conflict to peace, transitions into authoritarian 
rule, and transitions into consolidated democracies as evidence of the changing meaning of 
transition.107 In an earlier article, Hansen directly contests the traditional understanding of 
transitional justice as a response to transitions from authoritarianism to democratization,108 
stating that if transitional justice is ‘understood as a set of practices that deal systematically 
with grave human rights abuses, [it] no longer exclusively concerns societies in transition to a 
liberal democracy.’109 Hansen further argued that:  
‘[…] relying on a normative framework formed in the early 1990s, which is heavily 
influenced by conceptions of justice in democratic transitions, may not be sufficient 
when attempting to understand what purposes contemporary processes of 
transitional justice actually serve, and it may pose serious challenges to our attempts 
at appreciating the character of and challenges to these practices.’110 
However, while Hansen’s broadened understanding of transition accounts for the political roots 
of the field, he maintains similar backwards-looking considerations of the traditional 
understanding. By defining transitional justice as dealing with ‘grave human rights abuses’, 
Hansen perpetuates the field’s focus on civil and political rights violations (CPRV) and issues 
                                                 
105 Muvingi, "Sitting on Powder Kegs,” 165; Arthur, "How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights”; Boraine, 
“Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation”; Padraig McAuliffe, "The Prospects for Transitional Justice in 
Catalyzing Socioeconomic Justice in Postconflict States: A Critical Assessment in Light of Somalias 
Transition," Northeast African Studies 14, no. 2 (Fall 2014); Nicola Henry, "From Reconciliation to Transitional 
Justice: The Contours of Redress Politics in Established Democracies," International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 9, no. 2 (March 22, 2015); Louis Bickford, “Transitional Justice,” in The Encyclopedia of Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity, (Macmillan Reference, USA 2004) Vol. 3, 1045-1047. 
106 Boraine, “Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation,” 17-18. 
107 Hansen, "The Time and Space of Transitional Justice," 41-47. 
108 Thomas Obel Hansen, "Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory," Oregon Review of International 
Law 13, no. 1 (2011). 
109 Hansen, "Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory," 2. 
110 Ibid., 3. 
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of physical violence – a symptom of the very political roots or ‘normative framework’ he was 
trying to overcome. 
Other scholars have cast transition in a way that allows for consideration of ESR and issues of 
structural violence. Sharp proposes a broader transition towards 'positive peace' as opposed to 
a transition to democracy or rule of law,111 with positive peace entailing the absence of social 
inequality.112 Sharp’s proposed understanding of transition reflects an expansion of both the 
backwards- and forwards-looking considerations of transitional justice and demonstrates the 
interdependency between these. By interpreting transition as an aspiration to a society 
characterized by social equality, Sharp demands that transitional justice address past and 
ongoing ESRV and structural violence that allow social inequality to perpetuate. 
The proliferation of transitional justice practices in consolidated democracies – including in 
Canada, Australia, and the USA113 – and during transitions into non-democratic rule – 
including in Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, and Chad114 – further demonstrates the broadening from 
the traditional understanding of transition and suggests a broad understanding is most 
appropriate. In her review of the matter, Christine Bell concludes that 'scholars and 
practitioners show no clarity as to whether there is or needs to be a bounded concept of 
‘transition’ during which transitional justice applies',115 while Joanna Quinn similarly 
concludes that ‘the strict focus on absolute ‘transition’ appears to be shifting’.116 Nonetheless, 
despite a broadened understanding of the meaning of transition, it remains an important and 
key feature of transitional justice.117 The transition context and the opportunities and 
constraints it provides in responding to past injustices is what differentiates transitional justice 
from the administration of ordinary justice. 
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2.3.2 Changing Meaning of Justice 
The understanding of ‘justice’ in transitional justice has also broadened. While having roots in 
criminal justice,118 scholars are increasingly considering other forms of justice as part of 
transitional justice. By providing a brief overview of the many forms of justice called on to 
advance transitional justice, this section will demonstrate justice as a highly contestable 
concept that is open to different and often competing understandings. 
The primary focus of traditional transitional justice has been the pursuit of criminal or 
retributive justice. Used interchangeably by some scholars,119 these forms of justice are 
characterized by the punishment of wrongdoers,120 the establishment of deterrence,121 the 
promotion of accountability,122 and the reestablishment of rule of law.123 Rama Mani refers 
instead to ‘rectificatory justice’,124 or the punishment of those ‘injustices that are direct 
consequences of conflict’, including ‘abuses committed against civilian non-combatants, gross 
human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity.’125 These forms of justice and 
their aims are primarily pursued through trials and criminal prosecutions (both national and 
international) and to a lesser extent lustration policies.126  
Their nuanced differences notwithstanding, the criminal, retributive, and rectificatory forms of 
justice share similar backwards- and forwards-looking considerations. In terms of backwards-
looking, they seek to address past injustices and administer punishment on wrongdoers, placing 
an emphasis on individual accountability.127 In terms forwards-looking, the administration of 
                                                 
118 Cahill-Ripley, “Foregoing Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice,” 188. 
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punishment is motivated by the goal of deterrence against future recurrence and creating a 
society characterized by accountability and the rule of law.128  
A secondary focus of traditional transitional justice is the pursuit of restorative justice. Defined 
as ‘justice that restores communities or relationships […] regarded as an alternative form of 
justice outside the formal judicial court system, at least according to western legal practice,’129 
restorative justice is often presented in contrast to criminal justice.130 While the end of the 
Argentinean military dictatorship in 1983 opened the opportunity for human rights violations 
to be punished through trials and prosecutions, at the foreground of discussions on how to 
address the past was the ‘threat to the stability of the new regime that such actions might 
pose.’131 Following a series of limited prosecutions and as mounting ‘unrest and instability’ 
undermined hopes for nonviolent transition, prosecutions were eschewed in favour of 
amnesties granted between 1986 and 1987.132 The fear that criminal justice during transitional 
periods may undermine fragile, short-term peace goals, ushered in restorative justice as an 
alternative to criminal justice, with trials and prosecutions dismissed in favour of truth 
commissions and amnesties.133 The ‘amnesty for truth’ and ‘amnesty for peace’ exchanges 
prompted concerns that restorative justice initiatives would undermine criminal justice 
goals,134 especially the rule of law,135 however some scholars believe criminal and restorative 
justice can complement one another when pursued together.136  
As opposed to criminal justice’s focus on punishment, restorative justice places greater 
emphasis on harm reparation, the restoration of relationships between people and communities, 
and victim recognition,137 and is associated with forgiveness, truth, and reconciliation.138 Mani 
prefers the term ‘reparative justice’ as ‘more humble, realistic and appropriate in the traumatic 
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post-conflict context, where repair may be more feasible a goal than restoration’,139 achieved 
through reparations140 and symbolic efforts such as memorialization, commemoration, and 
public apology.141 Restorative justice has both backwards- and forwards-looking 
considerations, aiming to provide truth and acknowledgement of past injustices, the role of 
perpetrators and their impact on victims, and advancing the forwards-looking goal of 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. 
With a focus on criminal and restorative justice, scholars have bemoaned transitional justice’s 
failure to advance social and distributive justice concerns. Through her highly influential 
article, Louise Arbour called on transitional justice to address previously neglected economic 
and social justice concerns and to advance social justice, or '[the] minimum legal standards 
guaranteeing substantive equality […] in the fulfilment of the idea of freedom from want.’142 
Distributive justice is similar to social justice, with some scholars conflating the two.143 
Recognised by Mani as the most neglected form of justice, distributive justice ‘stem[s] from 
structural and systemic injustices and distributive inequalities that frequently underlie the 
causes of conflict.’144 In South Africa, critics of the failure of legal and institutional reforms to 
restore democratic citizenship and reform an ‘abusive state security apparatus’ called for 
distributive justice to ‘redistribut[e] […] wealth that was unjustly accumulated through an 
inhuman political and economic system.’145 For these critics, a legalistic, criminal or retributive 
form of justice failed to directly address the nature of past injustices of Apartheid, where 
distributive justice could have been more responsive to demands for justice in transition. 
The social and distributive forms of justice are often associated with advancing positive or 
sustainable peace,146 which, as opposed to negative peace or the absence of physical violence, 
demands the absence of both physical and structural violence, including social inequality.147 
These forwards-looking ambitions in turn inform backwards-looking considerations: in  pursuit 
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of a society characterized by equality, transitional justice conceptualized as advancing social 
or distributive must address past ESRV and ongoing structural violence.  
Contributing to calls for transitional justice to advance distributive or social justice, some 
scholars believe transitional justice should aim to transform societies in transition. For Gready 
et al., transformative justice aims to ‘change pre-conflict structures in ways that are more 
inclusive, less unequal and more fair’ by placing a greater emphasis on the need to address the 
‘structural and ‘everyday’ violence(s)’ previously neglected by transitional justice and its 
traditional mechanisms.148 Lambourne similarly believes it should aim for the ‘transformation 
of social, economic and political structures and relationships’149 through a ‘hybrid’ or holistic 
approach, incorporating elements of retributive, restorative, socioeconomic, and political 
justice.150 While some scholars believe transitional justice has the potential to achieve this 
transformation,151 others cast transformative justice as a distinct concept from transitional 
justice. Evans is critical of transitional justice’s ‘narrow set of tools’, and believes it is ill-suited 
to address structural violence and ensure socioeconomic rights.152 Evans proposes 
transformative justice as a distinct concept that can addresses the structural violence and 
socioeconomic injustice issues neglected by the transitional justice’s focus on CPR.153  
Whether considered to prevent the outbreak of conflict (where structural violence and social 
inequality may lead to violence)154 or to create a more equitable society characterized by 
positive or sustainable peace,155 the forwards-looking considerations of transformative justice 
place greater emphasis on ESRV, structural violence, and social inequality as the objects of its 
backwards-looking considerations. Rooted in calls for transitional justice to address concerns 
beyond accountability and criminal justice,156 transformative justice offers a strong challenge 
to the traditional understanding of the concept. 
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While this overview addressed some of the various forms of justice discussed in transitional 
justice literature, it is not an exhaustive account. Scholars continue to explore how transitional 
justice can address different forms of injustices. Transitional justice has been called on to 
address 'continuing racial inequality' in the United States as a form of racial justice,157 or to 
address continuing physical, economic, and social form of gender-based violence in post-
conflict societies to advance gender justice.158 Furthermore, various scholars recommend 
holistic or integrated approaches to pursuing transitional justice, including through the pursuit 
of different forms of justice simultaneously.159 Boraine advocates a holistic approach to 
transitional justice where criminal justice is complemented by restorative justice,160 allowing 
transitional justice to address two imperatives of a country under transition: the need to re-
establish the rule of law and hold perpetrators accountable through prosecutions, and the need 
to re-build societies and achieve reconciliation.161 The proliferation of calls for transitional 
justice to pursue additional forms of justice confirms the field’s broadening from its roots in 
the criminal and restorative forms, and suggests the need for a concept of transitional justice 
that allows a broad understanding of justice. 
2.3.3 Mechanisms 
Despite broadening in terms of its justice and transition components, transitional justice is still 
‘largely confined [to] a fairly specific set of mechanisms’,162 with traditional transitional justice 
measures being used in ‘very different sorts of political and practical dilemmas.’163 In calling 
for transitional justice to go beyond pursuing criminal justice, for example, Arbour considers 
how existing mechanisms, including truth commissions, prosecutions, judicial enforcement, 
reparations, and restitution, may advance economic and social justice.164 Mani similarly 
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advocates for a broadened framework of reparative justice to be pursued through transitional 
justice mechanisms.165 In considering greater inclusion of ESR in transitional justice, the UN 
limits their discussion to how truth commissions, judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, 
reparations, and institutional reform may integrate these rights.166  
These approaches reflect a trend in which scholars, in response to the field’s broadening, have 
opted to consider how traditional transitional justice mechanisms may be repurposed to better 
achieve these goals,167 instead of considering alternative mechanisms. In their generation of a 
data set of transitional justice from 1970 to 2007, for example, Tricia Olsen et al. adopt a broad 
conceptualization of transitional justice in order to 'provide scholars with the necessary data to 
grapple with the complexities surrounding it', and refrain from 'making normative assumptions 
about the appropriate form of justice' in face of varying understandings of justice.168 Despite 
recognising the need to conceptualize transitional justice broadly, they narrowly define 
transitional justice along the specific mechanisms of trials, truth commissions, amnesties, 
reparations, and lustrations.169 
What these scholars fail to realize is that this ‘narrow set of tools’,170 making up a toolkit of 
traditional transitional justice as early as 1994,171 was primarily implemented in response to 
specific forms of envisioned transitions (authoritarianism to democratization), wrongdoings 
(primarily CPRV), and calls for justice (criminal or retributive, and restorative). The resilience 
of the transitional justice toolkit means mechanisms are employed to tackle problems they may 
not equipped for. This puts transitional justice at the risk of becoming a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach, where its practices are technocratic and decontextualized,172 and fail to adequately 
address broadening demands for justice in transitional societies. 
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2.4. Transitional Justice – A Concept 
In the introduction to Kritz’s Transitional Justice, Charles Smith described transitional justice 
as ‘a defining theme of the second half of the twentieth century [that is] likely to endure well 
into the new millennium’.173 While Smith’s prediction of transitional justice’s endurance was 
undoubtedly correct - evidenced by its global proliferation and consolidation as a field - it did 
not endure as envisioned at the time. As demonstrated in this Chapter, the field has broadened 
from its roots in the transition to democracy paradigm and its focus on criminal and restorative 
forms of justice, and moved towards a concept of transitional justice viewed more broadly than 
its traditional counterpart. Nonetheless, the broadening of the field has done little to bring 
consensus on an understanding of the concept itself.  
The persistent lack of consensus on an understanding of transitional justice may be because 
transitional justice ‘is an inherently political practice, ill-suited to technical definitions’,174 a 
view taken in this dissertation. This inherently political nature suggests transitional justice is 
best understood as a contestable concept – an observation Sharp, Bell, and Ainley have already 
made. For these scholars, the inherent politics of transitional justice is best accounted for by 
identifying the concept and its goals as essentially or effectively contestable.175 A concept is 
effectively contestable when its contestability is a property of political discourse. In the present 
case, transitional justice is an effectively contestable concept due to the varied understandings 
of transition and justice that emerge from political discourse. While the Western liberal agenda 
of the formative years of transitional justice understood justice in its criminal form, transitional 
societies marred by economic or social rights violations, structural violence, or social 
inequality may demand justice in terms of its social or distributive forms. By understanding 
transitional justice and its key components as effectively contestable, and by adopting a broad 
understanding of the concept, it is  rendered more useful and accommodating of the needs and 
demands of diverse transitional contexts. 
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2.4.1 Practical Conceptual Analysis 
The understanding of transitional justice as contestable informs our pragmatic conceptual 
analysis of the concept. Given its contestable nature, an understanding of transitional justice 
that presupposes the pursuit of particular forms of justice or normative goals runs contrary to 
the inherent politics of the field, and is untenable.176 Instead, consensus may be found on an 
understanding of the concept that is not undergirded by political assumptions and allows for 
debate and disagreements around highly debatable components of the concept. Sharp alludes 
to a similar approach in arguing for a broader interpretation of transitional justice which 
incorporates social justice:  
The goal is not to conflate transitional justice with social justice writ large […]. 
Rather, by carefully considering and deconstructing assumptions implicit in the 
narratives of the field, both historical and emerging, it may be possible to liberate 
policy making from narrow pathways and paradigms that may stymie creativity and 
thinking […].177 
While advocating for an understanding of transitional justice that allows for long-term positive 
peace, Sharp’s point of accounting for inherent politics and moving away from preconceived 
notions undergirding the field is instructive. Thus, a pragmatic conceptual analysis of 
transitional justice should identify those key components that make it a distinct concept – 
components which, given the concept’s contestable nature, are likely to be the subject of debate 
and unlikely to find broad consensus. This approach brings transitional justice closer to 
Dhawan’s understanding of the concept as 'a travelling norm which can never be filled with 
one particular meaning but changes over time and space.'178 
Informed by this Chapter’s overview of the changing meanings of transition and justice, and 
the past injustices these entail and the aspirations they should pursue, a pragmatic conceptual 
analysis reveals certain key components of transitional justice. Transitional justice and its key 
components may be understood as: the pursuit of justice (justice component) during a period 
of social or political transition (transition component), in order to address past injustices 
(backwards-looking component) and work towards certain aspirations for the future (forwards-
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looking component). A final component is the choice in mechanisms taken to advance 
transitional justice. 
The multiplicity of approaches considered to contribute towards transitional justice incorporate 
these components, however imbue them with different understandings. These varied 
understandings of the key components – the result of their inherently political or contestable 
nature – are the varying conceptions of the concept of transitional justice. Taking the traditional 
understanding of transitional justice, for example, it is possible to identify a ‘traditional 
conception’ of transitional justice that understands the justice component as entailing the 
pursuit of criminal or restorative justice; the transition component as entailing transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy; the backwards-looking component as entailing concern over 
bodily integrity harms, physical violence, or other CPRV; the forwards-looking component as 
entailing efforts establish democracy and rule of law; and the choice in mechanisms as entailing 
trials and truth commissions. 
These key components are interdependent, with an understanding of one impacting the 
understanding of the others. Zinaida Miller’s description of transitional justice as a ‘definitional 
project’, for example, demonstrates the interplay between the justice, backwards- and 
forwards-looking components. Miller describes the process of transitional justice as 
‘explaining who has been silenced by delineating who may now speak, describing past violence 
by deciding what and who will be punished and radically differentiating a new regime in 
relation to what actions were taken by its predecessor.’179 For Miller, the decision not to address 
economic concerns as a matter of justice is an act of politics in itself.180 To put Miller’s 
observations in terms of the above analysis, we see that the decision to understand justice as 
excluding its distributive or social forms (justice component) leaves socioeconomic injustices 
of the past unaddressed (backwards-looking component) and allows these injustices to 
perpetuate into the future (forwards-looking component).  
This leaves the question of whether to prescribe transitional justice with a set of mechanisms. 
As discussed earlier in this Chapter, transitional justice mechanisms continue to be repurposed 
to meet new demands placed on them, despite being originally intended to address particular 
injustices. From the perspective of the above analysis, however, defining transitional justice 
along a set of specific mechanisms risks prescribing how the different components should be 
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understood. As Arthur has observed, the field’s preoccupation with a particular set of measures 
is influenced by the normative aims of providing justice in its criminal or restorative forms and 
establishing democracy.181 Taking trials and prosecutions as an example, defining transitional 
justice as inclusive of these mechanisms risks prescribing an understanding of justice in its 
criminal form and placing a focus on addressing CPR. This reduces transitional justice to a 
technocratic, decontextualized, or ‘one-size-fits-all’ practice,182 whereby its mechanisms fail 
to meet demands other than those originally intended for. Therefore, the above proposed 
understanding of transitional justice intentionally refrains from prescribing the concept with a 
set of mechanisms.  
This is not to say that traditional transitional justice mechanisms cannot advance calls for 
justice beyond its criminal or restorative forms. There is much discussion of the potential for 
truth commissions and reparations to pursue demands for economic and social justice.183 Nor 
is it suggested that these mechanisms will not play an integral role in pursuing transitional 
justice. Given that pre-transition periods may be characterized by instances of both physical 
and structural violence (as in the case of South Africa under Apartheid), it is likely that 
transitional justice will be called upon to address demands for criminal or restorative justice, 
in which its traditional mechanisms may be effective, and demands for social or distributive 
justice, in which it may have to look outside its standard toolkit. Rather, if transitional justice 
is to respond to various forms of transition and calls for justice, and backwards- and forwards-
looking considerations, it should look beyond a restrictive toolkit devised in a particular 
moment in history. 
2.4.2 Addressing Counter-Arguments 
Scholars may argue that such an understanding of transitional justice is too broad to be 
meaningful or realistic. Naomi Roht-Arriaza has cautioned over ‘broadening the scope of […] 
transitional justice to encompass the building of a just as well as peaceful society may make 
the effort so broad as to become meaningless.’184 Lars Waldorf warns against expanding a field 
that has ‘already inflated expectations’ with ‘unrealizable expectations’,185 while Mani 
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similarly expresses concern that ‘the mandates of existing TJ mechanisms are already 
overcharged, their responsibilities too heavy, public expectations too unrealistic and finances 
already too lean’.186 
While these concerns are valid, it is important to recall the distinction between a concept and 
its varying conceptions. While the above proposed understanding of transitional justice is broad 
and accommodates multiple forms the transition, justice, and backwards- and forwards-looking 
considerations, it is not suggested that these be addressed simultaneously. Instead, a broad 
understanding allows for multiple and potentially narrower conceptions. This approach allows 
the particular conception of transitional justice employed to be determined by local context, 
victims’ needs, and other relevant considerations, and ensures a conception that is best suited 
to meet the demands of the situation at hand. How transition and justice are understood, which 
past injustices should be addressed, and which future aspirations should be pursued should not 
be determined by a set of specific experiences in the post-Second World War period or during 
the thaw in the Cold War of the 1980s and 1990s, but rather by the specific experiences of the 
society demanding justice. 
This broadened understanding may also incite referral to Sartori’s concern over conceptual 
stretching. As discussed in the introduction, conceptual stretching is the broadening of the 
meaning of a concept to the extent that it lacks clear limitations or definitions.187 However, 
Sartori’s concern was over the obfuscation of concepts which had been ‘previously defined 
and refined […] by generations of philosophers and political theorists’,188 a characterization 
not befitting of transitional justice. Given its brief lifespan, past and current discord in the field, 
and a recognised lack of consensus on an understanding of the concept, there is little to suggest 
that there is a well-established, ‘defined and refined’ concept of transitional justice to stretch 
from. Rather, the opposite concern is more likely – that an adamant defence of a traditional 
understanding of transitional justice results in a concept that is too specific and prescriptive, 
potentially rendering it irrelevant and inapplicable in assisting different societies transition out 
of a troubled past.  
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2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In order to find the reason behind the lack of consensus on a meaning of transitional justice, 
this Chapter addressed the historical and political roots that influenced the traditional 
conception of transitional justice. These roots show a Western liberal agenda during the 
formative years of transitional justice which sought to guide societies transitioning from 
authoritarianism into the direction of a Western style liberal democracy. This agenda and the 
experiences of Latin American countries in transition influenced transitional justice’s focus on 
the normative aims of securing democracy, accountability, and rule of law through criminal 
and restorative justice and their accompanying trials and truth commissions.  The success of 
the West in the decades long ideological struggle of the Cold War also secured a focus on CPR 
to the neglect of ESR, preventing transitional justice from facilitating a social transition or 
transformation. The Chapter then considered how these roots and their influences were 
galvanized in the traditional conception of transitional justice held today through a process of 
consolidation, internationalisation, and standardisation. The field’s broadening from its 
traditional understanding of ‘justice’ and ‘transition’ brought new demands that are at odds 
with the tradition conception of transitional justice, creating a lack of consensus on what 
transitional justice is and what it should accomplish.  
This Chapter concluded that a broad understanding of transitional justice that allows for 
multiple and potentially competing understandings of its justice, transition, and backwards- 
and forwards-looking components is the only way to bring consensus to the effectively 
contestable concept of transitional justice. Transitional justice should be understood broadly as 
the pursuit of justice during periods of social or political transition, in order to address past 
injustices and works towards certain aspirations for the future, comprising of the key 
components of justice, transition, and backwards- and forwards-looking considerations, and 
the mechanisms that advance these.  While seemingly vague or too ambiguous to be 
meaningful, this proposed understanding is broad enough to accommodate various 
understandings the hotly contested components of transitional justice, allowing it to be more 
responsive to the particular circumstances of various transitional contexts and their victims, 
including demands for ESRV, structural violence, and social inequality to be addressed. 
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For Nickson and Braithwaite, a broadened understanding of the justice in transitional justice 
allows ‘space to deliver non-western as well as western conceptions of virtuous justice.’189 
Similarly, by adopting a broad understanding of transitional justice we can begin to 
differentiate between the traditional conception of transitional justice that is most prevalent 
today, and other conceptions that address matters of justice during transition differently, 
including the example of Revolutionary Nicaragua. 
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Chapter Three: Addressing Economic and Social Rights and Structural Violence as 
Transitional Justice 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
Serving in part to define the injustices of the past and to recognise victims in need of justice, 
transitional justice’s prioritization of CPR has excluded persons solely impacted by ESRV and 
structural violence from being defined as victims or the most ‘deserving’ of victims.190 As a 
result, transitional justice has often advanced justice in communities which have experienced 
unlawful interferences with their ESR, and have been subject to (and often continue to be 
subject to) marginalization and difficulty in meeting their most basic needs, without these 
issues being addressed as a matter of justice.  
In South Africa, the system of Apartheid and the social and racial inequality it was 
characterized by has been considered the ‘very embodiment of the concept of structural 
violence’.191 Nonetheless, the founding act of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
defined ‘victim’ restrictively, limited to persons impacted by ‘gross violations of human rights’ 
and further restricted to ‘killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person.’192 
The TRC’s restrictive definition of victimhood left hundreds of thousands of marginalized  
persons outside of its scope, and the structural violence and social and racial inequality of 
Apartheid unaddressed. Today, not only has inequality increased since the Apartheid-era, 
South Africa is considered one of the most unequal countries in the world.193  
Transitional justice’s neglect of ESR and structural violence is not exclusive to South Africa. 
In Nepal, families of disappeared persons prioritized basics needs such as food, health care, 
and children’s education (62 percent) nearly as much as the truth of the fate of the disappeared 
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(64 percent), while demand for prosecution was far lower (29 percent).194 In Bardiya, a rural 
district characterized by poverty and inequality and the most affected by disappearances,195 
discovering the truth behind the fate of the disappeared (70 percent) and basic needs (60 
percent) were highly prioritized,196 while demand for prosecution was limited (7 percent). 
Despite these demands, national and international human rights agencies called for 
disappearances in Nepal to be met with prosecution, criminalization, and accountability.197  
Similar results were found in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge Tribunal addressed matters 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other grave breaches under the Pol Pot Regime, 
despite a survey finding respondents prioritized jobs (83 percent) and services to meet basic 
needs such as health (20 percent), food (17 percent), and education (7 percent) above justice (1 
percent).198 The prioritization of economic and social matters over demand for accountability 
in Nepal and Cambodia is consistent with findings of similar surveys conducted in northern 
Uganda, Kenya, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.199 While the prioritization of 
these needs and demands may be subject to change, they nonetheless reveal the significance of 
economic and social matters in transitional contexts. 
The failure of transitional justice to give equal consideration to CPR and ESR and to consider 
the immediate needs of its beneficiaries has led to strong criticism of the practice, and calls for 
it to go beyond its traditional focus. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, 
whose influential call for economic and social justice to be incorporated into a ‘holistic’ 
conception of transitional justice is heralded by scholars as an important moment for the 
transitional justice field.200 While recognising transitional justice as anchored in the Nuremberg 
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trials and rooted in criminal justice, Arbour noted that the field has broadened and ‘outgrown 
its early framework’.201 Arbour was notably critical of traditional understandings of transitional 
justice and their prioritization of CPR, including interpreting the meaning of 'large-scale past 
abuses' in the UN definition of transitional justice to be ‘generally limited to CPRV amounting 
to crimes under international law,' thereby 'obscur[ing] the need to address gross violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights associated with conflict.'202 In light of this critique, Arbour 
believed ‘[t]ransitional justice must have the ambition to assist the transformation of oppressed 
societies into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will 
procure an equitable future.’203  
Arbour called on transitional justice to address previously neglected economic, social, and 
cultural rights violations that occurred prior to and during conflict. She proposed a series of 
measures to be taken to redress ‘deep-seated social and economic inequalities’, including 
constitutional recognition of rights, examining key legislation and their impact on rights, and 
adopting, reviewing, and strengthening legislation as part of institutional reform.204 Arbour 
believed transitional justice is well poised to ‘anchor’ economic, social, and cultural rights into 
the political, legal, and social structures of societies in transition. Significantly, Arbour 
challenged a key underlying assumption of the transitional justice field - the focus on criminal 
justice - by calling for greater economic and social justice, and not only called for violations of 
ESR to be addressed, but also structural violence, including social inequality. 
While the neglect of socioeconomic issues has been a concern since as early as South Africa’s 
TRC,205 much of transitional justice scholarship turned the full weight of its attention to 
considering the potential inclusion of ESRV and structural violence within transitional justice’s 
remit after Arbour’s call. The following year, the matter received specific consideration in an 
issue of the International Journal of Transitional Justice, with Mani concluding in its editorial: 
‘[transitional justice] cannot divorce itself from the broader concerns of citizens of transitional 
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societies or from the patterns of social injustice, violence, and exploitation that will continue 
to oppress them […].’206 For many scholars, transitional justice’s continued failure to address 
ESR threatens the legitimacy of the practice itself. 
This Chapter considers how transitional justice scholarship has responded to calls for 
socioeconomic issues to be included within the scope of the field. Firstly, it provides necessary 
clarification on the differentiation between ESRV and structural violence, including social 
inequality. Secondly, it reviews the varying degrees to which ESRV and structural violence 
have been brought within transitional justice’s scope through the broad, narrow, and 
conservative approaches taken by scholars. Thirdly, it identifies and addresses conceptual and 
practical challenges to the inclusion of structural violence within transitional justice as raised 
within the literature. Finally, it concludes by finding a way forward for bringing both ESRV 
and structural violence within the concept of transitional justice. It will be argued that persistent 
assumptions about the key components of transitional justice (as discussed in Chapter Two) 
have replaced the field’s prioritization of CPR with a prioritization of those rights, including 
ESR, whose violations are justiciable and most susceptible to judicial or quasi-judicial remedy, 
leaving matters of structural violence out of the field’s purview and traditional transitional 
justice intact. 
3.2 Differentiating between ESRV and Structural Violence 
Whereas Chapter Two focused on transitional justice’s prioritization of CPR to the neglect of 
ESR and the causes thereof, this Chapter considers emerging calls for ESR and structural 
violence to be included within transitional justice’s scope. Prior to considering this, it is 
necessary to note the points of convergence and divergence between ESRV and structural 
violence and its various forms, including social inequality. This understanding is necessary to 
avoid erroneously conflating the two, as many transitional justice scholars are wont to do,207 
and allows for a better understanding of where and why a line is drawn between the two in 
calls for their inclusion. 
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3.2.1 Economic and Social Rights Violations 
Economic and social rights are a ‘set of legal obligations’ on the part of States, provided for in 
various regional and international human rights instruments and domestic legislation.208 The 
‘tripartite typology’ of ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ determines what these obligations entail and 
which duties they place on States.209 According to this typology, States have an obligation to 
respect ESR, or refrain from interfering in their existing enjoyment, to protect ESR, or ensure 
their enjoyment is not interfered with by non-State actors, and to fulfil ESR, or take immediate 
and progressive steps to secure their enjoyment.210 Contrary to the false dichotomy frequently 
invoked within transitional justice scholarship that views CPRV as direct violations and ESRV 
as indirect violations, violations of these rights can be both direct and indirect, with all placing 
positive and negative obligations on the State. Violations of ESR are direct where a State or its 
actors interfere with these rights (corresponding closely with the obligation to respect, a 
negative obligation),211 or indirect where a State fails to take progressive steps to ensure these 
rights are realized (corresponding closely with the obligation to fulfil, a positive obligation).  
3.2.2 Structural Violence 
The term ‘structural violence’ was first coined by Johan Galtung, who constructed a ‘typology 
of violence’ consisting of personal, structural, and cultural violence.212 For the purposes of this 
discussion, it is important to note Galtung’s differentiation between personal or direct violence, 
‘where the actor(s) and object(s) of violence are readily identifiable’,213 and structural or 
indirect violence, where ‘there may not be any person who directly harms another person in 
the structure.’214  
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Within transitional justice literature, structural violence has been defined as ‘a condition in 
which violence occurs without being precipitated by the direct actions of specific individuals 
against other specific individuals’, and may be considered similar or synonymous to social 
injustice.215 Structural violence exists where State structures support the unequal distribution 
of power or agency, which is further exacerbated by the unequal distribution of resources.216 
This may manifest in varying forms, including through the ‘three major pillars’ of social 
marginalization, political exclusion, and economic exploitation,217 or more broadly poverty, 
exclusion, and inequality.218 Social inequality can be considered the consequence of structural 
violence, with Paul Farmer concluding: ‘[s]ocial inequalities are at the heart of structural 
violence.’219 In additional to social inequality, structural can manifest in various forms of 
inequality, including racial, gender, or economic inequality.  
3.2.3 Link between ESRV and Structural Violence 
There is a strong link between ESRV and structural violence,220 namely in that structural 
violence negatively effects these rights and may constitute a failure of the State’s obligation to 
fulfil them. Where government resources for education or health care facilities are consistently 
unequally distributed between urban and rural communities to the neglect of the latter (as in 
the case of Nicaragua discussed in Chapter Four), rural communities are victim to both 
structural violence and indirect violations of their ESR, namely their rights to health and 
education. This link is broken, however, where ESR are directly violated or in ways that are 
unrelated to systems or structures. An arbitrary or unlawful eviction constitutes a direct 
violation of the right to housing, without necessarily being related to structural violence. As 
demonstrated by the above examples, the points of convergence and divergence between ESRV 
and structural violence largely rests on whether the violation is direct or indirect.221 As this 
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Chapter will show, this distinction is significant in calls for transitional justice to include ESRV 
only where such violations are justiciable and perpetrators thereof identifiable. 
3.3 Degrees of Inclusion of ESRV and Structural Violence within Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice scholars have advocated for the inclusion of ESRV and structural violence 
within the field’s scope to varying degrees. These degrees may be loosely categorized between 
those adopting conservative or narrow approaches, where ESR and their violations are included 
and matters of structural violence are excluded or marginalized, and those adopting a broad 
approach, where both ESRV and structural violence are included. A review of the narrow 
approach will demonstrate that persistent assumptions about transitional justice and its key 
components that led to the field’s neglect of ESR are now the cause for the neglect of structural 
violence by the field. Conversely, the broad approach reveals a departure from traditional 
understandings of transitional justice and its key components, as scholars reconceptualize the 
concept towards one which can address structural violence. 
3.3.1 Conservative Approaches to the Inclusion of ESRV and Structural Violence 
The most pointed and direct rebuttal to calls for transitional justice to address socioeconomic 
inequalities is offered by Lars Waldorf.222 Insisting that transitional justice should maintain its 
focus on redressing CPRV,223 Waldorf presents a defence of a narrow, traditional 
understanding of transitional justice, which he views as ‘inherently short-term, legalistic and 
corrective’.224 Waldorf is not unsympathetic to the importance of ESR concerns during periods 
of transition, acknowledging that ‘everyday injustices rooted in historical inequalities may be 
as important, if not more important, for many survivors than the extraordinary injustices of 
gross human rights abuses’,225 and further suggesting that the ‘strongest rationale […] for 
transitional justice socio-economic wrongs is where that reflects the needs and priorities of 
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victims and survivors’.226  Instead, the point of contention for Waldorf is ‘whether transitional 
justice mechanisms are practically suited for correcting such wrongs’.227  
In considering the viability of transitional justice mechanisms tackling socioeconomic wrongs, 
Waldorf specifically considers truth commissions and reparations. While these mechanisms 
have made the greatest contribution to this end,228 Waldorf finds their potential hampered by 
practical difficulties, including resource constraints, the risk of increasing already inflated 
expectations, and the short life-span of transitional justice mechanisms.229 As a result of these 
difficulties, Waldorf believes the longstanding social inequality is best relegated to a ‘post-
transitional’ period, and more appropriately redressed as a matter development rather than 
transitional justice. 
Another voice against transitional justice taking on structural violence and related matters can 
be found in Matthew Evans, an advocate for transformative justice and a strong proponent of 
the need to address structural violence, including in the transitional context. What distinguishes 
Evans from his transformative justice cohorts is his understanding of transformative justice as 
separate and distinct from transitional justice.230 While recognising emerging efforts within 
transitional justice to address socioeconomic inequality,231 Evans understands transitional 
justice as demarcated by the mechanisms it comprises (truth commissions, amnesties, and 
trials)232 and the set of injustices it focuses on (direct, interpersonal violence and CPRV),233 
and views the tools of transitional justice as ‘ill-suited’ and inadequate for addressing 
socioeconomic inequality and other forms of structural violence.234 While these mechanisms 
may have 'peripheral or unintended consequences' for transformative justice,235 they are not 
capable of bringing about transformation in socioeconomic structures – the focus of 
transformative justice.236 Instead, for structural violence to be effectively addressed and for 
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transformative justice goals to be pursued, a set of ‘new, specifically focused, tools’ is 
necessary.237 
By strictly adhering to a traditional understanding of transitional justice, Waldorf and Evans 
represent a conservative approach to the inclusion of ESRV and structural violence within the 
field’s scope. This approach sees traditional transitional justice, initially intended to address 
CPRV, as static and incapable of change, and therefore ill-suited to a broadening of its scope.  
3.3.2 Narrow Approaches to the Inclusion of ESRV and Structural Violence 
As opposed to the conservative approach, the narrow approach sees transitional justice as 
capable of addressing ESRV, while having marginal effect on structural violence. However, 
this broadening of transitional justice’s scope does not necessarily suggest a broadening from 
its traditional understanding. As this section will demonstrate, the narrow approach maintains 
a traditional understanding of transitional justice as primarily motivated by criminal justice and 
demand for individual accountability through trials and prosecutions. Consequently, a line is 
drawn between those ESRV which are justiciable and can be addressed through criminal justice 
and therefore transitional justice, and those violations, including structural violence, which can 
at best only be marginally addressed. 
At the foundation of the narrow approach is the distinction between the direct and indirect 
nature of ESRV and structural violence.  Sam Szoke-Burke uses this distinction to identify 
which ESR should be included in transitional justice, and which violations thereof should be 
prioritized.238 Drawing on the tripartite typology, Szoke-Burke differentiates between ‘State 
failures to respect and protect ESRs’ which are ‘generally discrete enough to be effectively 
included in transitional justice mandate’, violations of the obligation to fulfil ESR, whose 
inclusion is a ‘more complicated question’, and ‘[n]ationwide failure to fulfil ESR’, whose 
remedy is ‘less suited to transitional justice responses’.239 This distinction is similarly used by 
other scholars adopting the narrow approach. Evelyn Schmid’s discussion of the potential for 
ESRV to be addressed by international criminal law focuses primarily on examples of States’ 
failure to respect and protect these rights,240 while Mark Drumbl focuses on how these can be 
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addressed through criminal prosecution and civil litigation.241 Amanda Cahill-Ripley captures 
the distinction quite aptly in her observation: ‘[w]hilst in some cases it will be easy to identify 
specific acts of violence against individuals and communities that constitute grave violations 
of ESR, in other cases these violations will be a result of structural and endemic violence and 
repression by the State […].’242 
This distinction is further evident in discussions on transitional justice tackling ‘economic 
violence’. Economic violence ‘involves the economic and social aspects of injustice caused by 
human rights violations’,243 and is ‘broader than […] violations of ESR’, further including 
corruption, plunder of natural resources, and other economic crimes.244 Duthie differentiates 
between broad and narrow approaches to addressing economic violence, with the former also 
‘addressing structural problems such as poverty and inequality’, and the latter ‘focusing only 
on economic violence perpetrated by individuals and in direct connection to civil and political 
rights violations.’245 While both involve ESR, the narrow approach is concerned with their 
direct violation, or those where a perpetrator is clearly identifiable, whereas the broad approach 
is additionally concerned with their violation in a complex or structural manner, or where the 
perpetrator is not clearly identifiable.246 
This distinction as a means of determining which violations should be addressed by transitional 
justice is also evident in Diana Sankey’s proposed concept of ‘subsistence harms’. While 
believing the focus on CPR should be contested, Sankey argues it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of which harms should be addressed, offering such an understanding in the 
concept of ‘subsistence harms’ or ‘deprivations of the physical, mental and social needs of 
human subsistence, perpetrated against individuals or populations in situations of armed 
conflict or as an act of political repression, where the perpetrator acts with intent or with 
knowledge of the inevitable consequences of such deprivations’.247 For Sankey, this concept 
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‘distinguishes between those harms linked to socioeconomic issues that can be systematically 
addressed by transitional justice mechanisms and those, particularly issues of structural 
violence, that require longer-term approaches’.248 It should be noted that Sankey erroneously 
characterizes ESR as those which ‘remain focused on issues of fulfilment, rather than direct 
deprivation’.249 Recalling the tripartite typology of State obligations, it is clear that subsistence 
harms as defined by Sankey would constitute violations of the obligations to respect and protect 
ESR.250 Regardless, it is important to note the role of criminal justice in drawing a divisive line 
between the ‘subsistence harms’ transitional justice should address, and the ESRV and 
structural violence it should not. 
Further drawing a line between justiciable ESRV and non-justiciable ESRV and structural 
violence is the argument that the former are best addressed by transitional justice, while the 
latter should be addressed through development. Roger Duthie draws on the distinction 
between transitional justice and development ‘as the basis for advocating a narrow conception 
of transitional justice’.251 At the core of this distinction is Duthie’s view of transitional justice 
as being associated with corrective or criminal justice, which works towards the ‘repair of 
harms to individuals or groups’, while development is associated with distributive justice252 
and works towards ‘the distribution of goods and opportunities and to equitable outcomes’.253  
Duthie argues that despite their equal importance, violations of CPR and ESR may not be most 
effectively addressed by the same set of measures. He recalls that transitional justice measures 
were ‘initially conceived as responses to the most widespread and serious violations of CPR 
and to international crimes perpetrated by authoritarian regimes’,254 and therefore transitional 
justice should include ESRV only insofar as its existing mechanisms can be repurposed to 
‘pursue accountability and redress for the most serious violations of ESR and the international 
crimes that constitute economic violence’,255 and where they are closely related to physical 
violence and serious violations of CPR.256 On this basis, Duthie argues against a broad 
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approach to including economic violence in transitional justice that addresses structural 
problems, including poverty and inequality, citing as barriers the difficulty in identifying 
victims in need of redress, the lack of specifiable perpetrators, and poverty as anchored in the 
structure of society. Instead, transitional justice should limit itself to ‘facilitate or catalyse other 
interventions and broader reform, including those more squarely in the field of development, 
by among other things highlighting the relevance of past economic and social injustice.’257 This 
argument  is not far removed from the distinction between direct and indirect violations of ESR 
as a basis for the exclusion of structural violence, which similarly sees indirect violations as 
too complex to be addressed through transitional justice and its mechanisms.  
Finally, Padraig McAuliffe believes calls for transitional justice to address structural violence 
fail to account for realpolitik.258 The potential for transitional justice to addresses structural 
violence and social inequality is hampered by mechanisms which are ill-suited to resolve such 
issues, and the risk opposition from or alienating the political elite.259 McAuliffe came to such 
a conclusion when considering the potential for transitional justice to redress inequality in 
Somalia,260 finding that the political elite whose interests would be undermined by redressing 
inequality would oppose such efforts.261 Similar to Duthie, McAuliffe relegates issues of 
structural violence as long term issues, arguing that stability is a prerequisite for economic 
growth which may allow for subsequent ‘construction of roads, schools, or health clinics’ and 
to ‘generate welfare improvements’.262 Rather, it is ‘wiser to postpone highly contentious, 
potentially transformative transitional justice policies lest they undermine the delicate balance 
of power and compromise that [a] transition represents.’263  
While the narrow approach and a focus on criminal justice leave issues of structural violence 
out of the center of transitional justice’s scope, marginal attention may be given to such issues 
under this approach. Szoke-Burke considers how transitional justice mechanisms may have 
nominal effect to this end, suggesting that truth commissions can acknowledge State failure to 
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fulfil ESR and make necessary policy recommendations,264 that collective reparations and 
decentralized governance can empower communities to actively participate in their 
development and the remedying of historically marginalized ESR,265 and that vetting processes 
can target public or private actors whose practices contributed to inequality.266 Duthie believes 
transitional justice can help change narratives about structural violence issues, and therefore 
contribute to their remedy in the long-term through development.267 Well-intentioned as these 
suggestions may be, the limited potential for efficacy of these initiatives are often recognised 
by the same scholars suggesting them, and leave structural violence issues at the periphery of 
transitional justice. 
Through a maintained focus on criminal justice, the narrow approach to the inclusion of ESR 
in transitional justice excludes matters of structural violence and social inequality. This 
approach distinguishes between the violations of those rights which should and should not be 
addressed based on whether they are direct or indirect, simple or complex, or short-term or 
long-term issues, and whether perpetrators thereof are easily identifiable or hidden in broad 
structures of society.268 The reason for this differentiation is primarily to identify which 
violations are justiciable for the purposes of prosecution through trial or identification and 
naming-and-shaming through truth commissions. Sankey’s proposed concept of subsistence 
harms, for example, uses the language of perpetrator and intent to tailor a concept that ‘adheres 
to the requirements of international criminal law’,269 and is ripe for adjudication as a matter of 
transitional justice.  
The exclusion of structural violence as the object of criminal justice is not the point of 
contention, with the inadequacy of criminal justice to address structural violence through trials 
and prosecutions widely recognised by those adopting conservative, narrow and broad 
approaches alike.270 Instead, the error of the narrow approach is the presumption that 
transitional justice should primarily be administered through criminal justice and trials, 
prosecutions, or truth commissions, thereby leaving matters of structural violence out of its 
purview. This insistence prevents the possibility that structural violence may be addressed, as 
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a matter of transitional justice, through social or distributive justice, and by mechanisms or 
initiatives other than those traditionally associated with transitional justice. Thus, many of the 
key components of transitional justice are left unchanged: justice is understood in its criminal 
form, direct ESRV are addressed in addition to CPRV as a backwards-looking consideration, 
the rule of law and perpetrator accountability are the focus of forwards-looking considerations, 
and trials and truth commissions are the mechanisms of choice in advancing these.  
While early calls for transitional justice to address ESR may have been considered a challenge 
to the traditional conception of transitional justice, their inclusion has been accomplished with 
the traditional focus largely intact, much to the neglect of structural violence issues. It is no 
coincidence, then, that the rationale for the exclusion of structural violence is similar to earlier 
arguments for the exclusion of ESR, as captured in Chendra Sriram’s statement that ‘[w]hile 
specific violations of CPR such as torture or disappearance make clear targets, economic 
inequalities may be far more difficult to pin down.’271 The inclusion of ESRV into transitional 
justice’s scope through the narrow approach is in fact a false broadening that does little to 
challenge the traditional conception of transitional justice. 
3.3.3 Broad Approach 
Broad approaches to the inclusion of ESR within transitional justice see equal consideration of 
structural violence as both possible and necessary. As opposed to the absent or marginal 
consideration proposed under the narrow approach, the broad approach sees transitional justice 
take full consideration of and directly address structural violence and social inequality as a 
matter of truth and reconciliation, victim-centrism, negative and positive peace, or 
transformative justice. This approach is largely motivated by the pursuit of social or distributive 
justice, thus challenging the traditional focus on criminal justice. 
The failure of transitional justice to address matters of structural violence has been considered 
a threat to the goals of promoting truth and reconciliation. Drawing on the potential for 
transitional justice to define injustices of the past, Miller argues that the exclusion of structural 
violence from this definitional project risks portraying ‘inequality [as] a question of time or 
development rather than the entrenched ideology of elites’.272 This may well have been the 
case in South Africa, where the TRC’s focus on physical harms ‘obscured the “truth” about the 
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much more pervasive daily suffering of victims caused by the institutionalized repression and 
socioeconomic inequalities between racial groups’.273 This distortion of a legacy of injustice 
further serves to threaten reconciliation. Aiken observes that the TRC’s failure to address 
structural violence as an injustice of Apartheid undermined the recognition of shared 
responsibility by white South Africans for continued racial inequality, resulting in a ‘very real 
barrier for interracial reconciliation’.274 Aiken’s observation notably draws attention to the fact 
that while physical violence may have ended, societies in transition may suffer continued 
violence in the form of structural violence and social inequality. 
The demand for transitional justice to address structural violence has also been framed as a 
move towards victim-centrism. Citing empirical research showing that demands for security 
and basic needs are highly articulated by victims in post-conflict areas, Simon Robins identifies 
a gap between the stated needs of victims and what transitional justice actually delivers.275 
Robins believes the cause of this is a dominance of legalism over the transitional justice field 
which disconnects victim demands and transitional justice deliverables.276 This leaves 
transitional justice ‘violation and perpetrator’ centred, while a rhetoric of being ‘victim and 
need’ centred is used to generate moral legitimacy for the practices of the field.277 Robins 
suggests the focus of accountability in transitional justice should shift from accountability to 
law to accountability to victims.278 Matthew Mullen is similarly critical of the perpetrator-
centrism of traditional transitional justice, believing ‘perpetrators receive more headlines and 
protection than victims [and] courts and commissions receive more consideration than efforts 
to change the socioeconomic and political infrastructure.’279 This disconnect stands in sharp 
contrast to assurances of ‘the centrality of victims in the design and implementation of 
transitional justice processes and mechanism’,280 and echoes Mani’s concerns of transitional 
justice being divorced from the concerns of its victims.281 
Scholars have also argued that structural violence should be addressed as a matter of conflict 
prevention and ensuring negative peace, viewing it as a potential root cause of conflict. 
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Drawing on Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s observations on the threatening potential of 
unaddressed economic and social concerns in South Africa, Muvingi believes transitional 
societies are ‘sitting on powder kegs’ if structural violence is left unaddressed.282 Mullen 
believes ‘[s]tructural and cultural violence makes mass atrocities possible’, and therefore 
transitional justice should focus the ‘bulk of attention and resources on more expansive efforts 
to directly address vulnerabilities and dehumanization’.283 Such approaches view the potential 
for structural violence to lead to a recurrent outbreak of violence as a threat to the goal of non-
repetition.284 
Going beyond negative peace, structural violence can also be addressed in the pursuit of 
positive peace. Sharp envisions transitional justice as a transition towards ‘positive peace’, 
defined to include not only ‘negative peace’ or the absence of direct violence, but also the 
‘absence of more indirect forms of violence, including forms of structural violence’.285 Sharp 
believes the field’s traditionally narrow conception of violence – physical violence, including 
murder, rape, torture, and disappearances and other CPRV – leaves matters of economic 
violence unaddressed and perpetrators thereof enjoying impunity.286 Broadening from a narrow 
and legalistic focus on physical violence and CPRV, matters of economic violence, structural 
violence, and social inequality are addressed as threats to positive peace.287  
Included in the broad approach is a set of scholars advocating for transitional justice to take 
advantage of its transformative potential, or transformative justice, which has been described 
as sitting ‘at the radical end of a transitional justice continuum.’288 Despite a lack of agreement 
on its definition or components,289 proponents of transformative justice have a common aim of 
expanding the scope of transitional justice and placing greater focus on structural violence.290 
As opposed to Evans’ proposed transformative justice discussed above, these scholars believe 
the traditional conception of transitional justice should be challenged and reconceptualized to 
be more transformative.   
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Calls for transitional justice to exhaust its transformative potential emerges from a critique of 
the field’s failure to address structural and ‘everyday’ forms of violence. Situating transitional 
justice in terms of advancing sustainable peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, Wendy 
Lambourne calls on transitional justice to address concerns beyond accountability and legal 
justice through transformative justice,291 which aims for the ‘transformation of social, 
economic and political structures and relationships.’292 Placing greater emphasis on structural 
violence, Paul Gready et al. believe transformative justice should aim to ‘change pre-conflict 
structures in ways that are more inclusive, less unequal and more fair’,293 and in the pursuit of 
sustainable peace for all.294 McGill similarly situates transformative justice as a challenge to 
the individualism and legalism of transitional justice processes as it shifts attention to matters 
of structural violence.295 By placing structural violence at the forefront of the focus of 
transitional justice, the  ‘transformative conception’ of transitional justice is a stark challenge 
to the traditional conception of transitional justice and its focus on physical violence. 
Bringing structural violence and social equality into the focus of transitional justice demands 
a reconceptualization from its traditional conception and has several implications for its key 
components. The most important consequence is the broadening from the focus on criminal 
justice, with structural violence addressed as a matter of social and distributive justice.296 The 
proposal for transitional justice to adopt a ‘positive-peace paradigm’, for example, shifts the 
focus from criminal justice to further include social and distributive justice,297 with positive 
peace equated with the presence of social justice.298 This shift in focus in turn effects which 
injustices are addressed, or the backwards-looking component. Through social and distributive 
justice, transitional justice is called on to go beyond looking at CPRV and direct violations of 
ESR, and to further address indirect violations thereof, including the failure to fulfil these 
rights, structural violence, mass poverty, and social inequality as matters of justice. In terms of 
the forwards-looking component, the aspirations of transitional justice change from 
establishing democracy or the rule of law to pursuing positive peace or ending structural 
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violence and social inequality. Addressing structural violence in a transitional society also 
demonstrates the close relationship between the backwards- and forwards-looking 
components. Gready et al. highlight the importance of addressing the ‘past-present interface’ 
by identifying the link between challenges of the present (structural and ‘everyday’ violence) 
to structural issues that continue from the past.299 By addressing it in a transitional period, this 
approach serves to break the continuity of structural violence as an injustice of the past that 
may continue into the future. 
While there is a definite change in the justice, transition, and backwards- and forwards-looking 
components, there is limited change in the choice of mechanisms tasked with tackling 
transitional justice’s broadened scope. Scholars frequently call on existing mechanisms to 
‘develop to have deeper social impact’.300 While it is generally agreed that trials and 
prosecutions are ill-equipped to address structural violence, many scholars adopting even a 
broad approach believe truth commissions, individual or collective reparations, and 
institutional reform can be repurposed to address such issues,301 a notable exception being 
Sharp’s view that the choice in mechanisms should be determined by needs and local context, 
rather than selected from a predetermined toolbox.302 Similar to the finding in Chapter Two, 
the persistence of traditional transitional justice mechanisms endure despite a broadening of 
the field through calls for it to address ESRV and structural violence. 
3.4 Conceptual Challenges to the Inclusion of ESRV and Structural Violence within 
Transitional Justice 
The broad, narrow, and conservative approaches to the inclusion of socioeconomic issues 
within transitional justice creates a conflict as to how justice is understood in transitional 
justice. While initially the cause of neglect of ESR, the persistent focus on criminal justice has 
been able to accommodate direct violations of these rights, however now excludes the potential 
for transitional justice to address structural violence. This gives rise to several conceptual 
challenges in attempting to reconcile transitional justice’s traditional focus on criminal justice 
with demands for structural violence to be addressed as a matter of social or distributive justice. 
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A significant challenge is the primary focus on criminal justice by those adopting a traditional 
understanding of transitional justice, leaving little room for social or distributive justice to be 
given equal consideration. This focus on criminal justice and dominance of legalism largely 
favours the use of trials, prosecutions, and truth commissions as the primary mechanisms of 
the field, while it is widely recognised that these mechanisms are unable to address structural 
violence issues. Some scholars insist that these issues can be addressed through other 
mechanisms associated with traditional transitional justice. Despite recognition of their 
shortcomings, truth commissions and reparations or collective reparations are consistently 
offered for their potential to address these issues.303 While these may make marginal 
contribution at best, they are ill-equipped to give equal consideration to matters of structural 
violence within transitional justice. 
The error in repurposing traditional transitional justice mechanisms is recognising the 
constraints of traditional transitional justice due to the historical and political context it 
originated, demanding it broaden from these constraints, while simultaneously utilizing a set 
of mechanisms that perpetuate the constraints. If structural violence is to be addressed as a 
form of transitional justice, its traditional mechanisms should be supplemented by alternative 
mechanisms or initiatives better suited to the task. Trials and truth commissions may have met 
the justice demands in Latin American transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in the 
1980s and 1990s, however they were ill-equipped to address the structural violence and social 
inequality of Apartheid in South Africa. While this may also be considered a practical 
challenge, the conceptual challenge emerges where scholars adopting a narrow approach argue 
that structural violence should not be included because it cannot be adequately addressed by 
these mechanisms, without considering that alternative mechanisms may be possible. 
Transitional justice has become so defined by its mechanisms, that for some, it would not be 
transitional justice without trials and truth commissions.  
A similar conceptual challenge is the concern over the convergence and divergence of 
transitional justice and development. Many scholars have recognised certain overlap between 
the two fields and the potential for transitional justice to contribute to development. Concerns 
have been raised, however, over transitional justice taking on development responsibilities 
through a broadened focus on social or distributive justice. Central to this argument is the view 
of transitional justice as short-term and criminal justice oriented, while development is long-
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term and social or distributive justice oriented. Regarding the short- versus long-term concern, 
various scholars have argued that it is erroneous to assume that addressing ESR concerns is 
inherently long-term, whereas addressing their civil and political counterparts can be addressed 
in the short-term. Securing democracy and the rule of law (stated goals of traditional 
transitional justice) are hardly short-term projects, but rather depend on small steps taken 
during a transitionary period with the intention of these being secured in the long-term. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the distribution of much-needed 
food or health services can address social justice issues in the short-term, suggesting that issues 
of structural violence can be addressed within transitional justice’s time constraints, even if 
these overlap with long-term development issues. While not suggesting that transitional justice 
should address ESR to the degree of development, it is unclear why a clear separation between 
the two fields should be made with the effect of excluding social or distributive justice issues 
from transitional justice. Instead, social or distributive justice issues can be addressed in the 
short-term as a matter of transitional justice, especially where such issues are part of a legacy 
of injustice. 
Finally, the inability to reconcile different justice demands within the concept of transitional 
justice creates a crisis of legitimacy. Scholars within the broad approach argue that the failure 
to address structural violence obscures the truth of past injustices, threatens the potential for 
reconciliation, and undermines the promise of victim-centrism and non-repetition – stated aims 
and values of the field. Muvingi calls into question the ‘justness’ and the ‘very objectives’ of 
a transitional justice that prosecutes wrongdoers but does not address social inequality.304 If 
transitional justice fails to reconcile demands for social and distributive justice, it risks 
repeating its already recognised failures, as in the case of South Africa. While the traditional 
conception of transitional justice may adequately address the justice demands of societies 
marred by direct and physical violence, it will fail to meet the justice demands of societies that 
have seen both physical and structural violence at the risk of its own legitimacy. 
3.5 Towards a Broad Understanding of Transitional Justice 
As long as a traditional understanding of transitional justice persists, it will be ill-equipped 
both conceptually and practically to address structural violence, even where context demands 
it. As a solution to the conceptual challenges of reconciling the field’s traditional focus on 
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criminal justice with demands for social and distributive justice, it is necessary to recognise 
transitional justice as an effectively contestable concept. As discussed in Chapter Two, this 
allows for a broad understanding that gives room for debate around the concept’s key 
components, without undermining the concept itself. This ensures that the question of whether 
transitional justice should address criminal, social, distributive, or other forms of justice is not 
predetermined but rather left open as a subject of debate.  
Such a broad understanding is also important in answering the sub-question: Is redressing 
social inequality a conception of transitional justice? As long as transitional justice and its key 
components are defined by a narrow understanding of the concept that places a focus on 
criminal and restorative justice, CPRV, and trials and truth commissions, redressing social 
inequality cannot be considered a form of transitional justice. On the other hand, if a broad 
understanding is taken, the justice, transition, backwards- and forwards-looking components 
of transitional justice are flexible enough to be responsive to different demands for justice, 
including demands for social or distributive justice. This ‘social justice conception’ of 
transitional justice places a focus on social or distributive justice, envisions a transition to social 
equality or positive peace, and addresses past and ongoing ESRV, social inequality, and other 
forms of structural violence.  
If transitional justice aims to address the injustices of the past so that the future may be 
characterized by their absence, it should be conceptually flexible enough to consider the 
demands of the community in which it serves. Where past injustices include social inequality, 
mass poverty or other forms of structural violence, these must be addressed by transitional 
justice lest they continue into the future. With a broad understanding, the extent to which these 
and other injustices are addressed or excluded by transitional justice is determined by the 
context, including demands therefor and constraints preventing these demands be met. 
3.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter looked at calls within transitional justice literature for ESR to be included, to 
varying degrees, within the remit of the field, and considered how these challenged or 
reinforced traditional understandings of transitional justice. It found that a narrow approach 
that differentiates between justiciable and non-justiciable violations of these rights as a means 
of determining their inclusion simply perpetuates the field’s traditional focus on criminal 
justice, leaving structural violence out of the field’s scope. On the other hand, a broad approach 
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to the inclusion of these rights, including matters of structural violence, challenges the 
traditional conception of transitional justice to go beyond a focus on criminal justice by giving 
equal consideration to structural violence as a matter of social and distributive justice, 
reorienting the field around victims and their demands, and pursuing negative and positive 
peace. It concluded that in order to reconcile the traditional focus on criminal justice with 
demands for greater social and distributive justice, and to consider redressing social inequality 
as a form of transitional justice, it is necessary to adopt a broad understanding of transitional 
justice.  
While a broad understanding of transitional justice may resolve the conceptual challenge of 
reconciling the narrow and broad approaches, this does not address the practical viability of 
including structural violence and social inequality. Several scholars have criticized discussions 
of ESR and structural violence for living in the abstract,305 and have called for practical 
examples to be considered to support such discussion.306 Various practical challenges have 
been raised to the inclusion of structural violence within transitional justice. These practical 
challenges include: time constraints, where transitional justice is a short-term affair while 
remedying structural violence, poverty and social inequality require long-term commitment; 
resource constraints, where insufficient financial and human resources are said to be barriers 
to transitional justice addressing these injustices; the role of political elite, specifically their 
potential to act as spoilers of attempts to challenge the socioeconomic status quo; and 
overburdening, which views the broadening of transitional justice as aggravating an already 
wide mandate and inflated expectations. These practical challenges prompt the question: what 
would transitional justice addressing structural violence look like in practice? In the following 
Chapter, the case of revolutionary Nicaragua and their efforts to deal with the injustices of the 
past will be considered as a form of transitional justice. Their example sheds light on both 
conceptual and practical matters of transitional justice addressing structural violence, including 
how many of the practical challenges identified above may be overcome.   
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Chapter Four: Addressing Social Inequality as Transitional Justice in Revolutionary 
Nicaragua  
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three addressed the conceptual challenges to the inclusion of economic and social 
rights and structural violence within the scope of transitional justice and proposed a broad 
understanding of the concept that allows its key components to be determined by the demands 
placed on it. However, while a broad understanding may resolve conceptual challenges, it 
remains to be shown how transitional justice can practically address issues of structural 
violence and social inequality. As Haldemann and Kouassi wrote, if the inclusion of these 
rights is ‘not to be merely an abstract ideal without practical import, it must provide a realistic 
view of how to make it “work” in the world as it is.’307 This Chapter aims to meet this demand 
by presenting revolutionary Nicaragua as a case for further study that can ground current 
debates on the inclusion of ESR, structural violence, and social inequality within the 
transitional justice field with a practical example, and demonstrate how this could be made to 
‘work’. 
Revolutionary Nicaragua is a particularly interesting case for the purposes of the current 
discussion, however has received little attention within transitional justice discourse. From a 
conceptual perspective, the exclusion of revolutionary Nicaragua as a possible example of 
transitional justice is a direct result of the inherent politics of the field. With transitional justice 
initially defined along the paradigm of transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the 
context of Cold War politics, Nicaragua’s transition from authoritarianism to democratic 
socialism was unpalatable and readily dismissed as a transitional justice project. Even after this 
paradigm changed, revolutionary Nicaragua’s focus on advancing ESR and redressing social 
inequality did not find welcome accommodation among transitional justice’s focus on CPR. 
Because of this neglect, and because ‘in the case of Nicaragua, external actors did not promote 
[transitional justice] in 1979’,308 revolutionary Nicaragua has valuable lessons to offer as 
traditional understandings of transitional justice are being challenged. Beyond questions of a 
conceptual nature, the case of revolutionary Nicaragua may also shed light on questions 
regarding practical challenges of transitional justice’s potential to address structural violence 
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and social inequality. Through a concerted effort, the revolutionary government addressed the 
most severe symptoms of these injustices through short-term projects and in the face of severe 
resources constraints – challenging the practical difficulties raised by sceptics. 
In her analysis of the political roots of transitional justice, Arthur may well have been 
‘exploring the idea that if paradigmatic political transitions of the 1980s and 1990s had been 
conceived of as transitions to socialism, the scope, focus, and modalities of transitional justice 
might look quite different today.’309 In response to this line of inquiry, where Sharp believes 
we may only ‘speculate’,310 revolutionary Nicaragua can give valuable and practical insight 
into an understanding of transitional justice developed outside of its traditional roots. This 
insight will show how redressing social inequality may be considered a form of transitional 
justice in practice. 
4.1.1 Transitional Justice Literature and Revolutionary Nicaragua 
Astrid Bothmann identified a ‘severe scholarly neglect throughout the past two decades’ of 
Nicaragua, including in the transitional justice field.311 In transitional justice literature, 
Nicaragua has appeared ‘only in a handful of articles, most of which provide a short 
comparative overview of TJ policies in Central American states.’312 Before considering 
Bothmann’s own contribution to the topic, it is helpful to briefly address Nicaragua’s scarce 
mention in transitional justice literature to understand the reason for its neglect.  
Kritz’s voluminous work on transitional justice notably excludes revolutionary Nicaragua as a 
case of an ‘emerging democratic societ[y] address[ing] the legacies of their repression of their 
own people.’313 At this time, Kritz’s understanding of ‘transition’ as transition from 
authoritarianism to Western liberal democracy could not reconcile revolutionary Nicaragua’s 
transition from authoritarianism under Somoza to democratic socialism under the Sandinistas 
as a case of transitional justice. Revolutionary Nicaragua’s mention in Kritz’s work is brief but 
instructive, elucidating the case’s early exclusion from traditional understandings of 
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transitional justice, beginning with the transition from authoritarianism to democracy paradigm 
in the 1990s.314  
While transitional justice outgrew the transition from authoritarianism to democracy paradigm, 
this did not bring Nicaragua into the field’s purview. Critical of ‘relying on a normative 
framework formed in the early 1990s’315 and believing it to be insufficient for understanding 
contemporary transitional justice, Hansen directly challenged the transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy paradigm. With this conceptual barrier out of the way, Hansen 
considered revolutionary Nicaragua an example of a ‘non-liberal transition.’316 In his analysis, 
Hansen acknowledges the revolutionary government’s improved human rights record in some 
areas, however is critical of the trials of Somoza supporters by ‘popular tribunals’ and 
politically appointed and unqualified judges, the declaration of a state of emergency in 1982 
and subsequent restrictions on the rights to assembly, freedom of speech and habeus corpus, 
and finally that the government ‘did not sit on a democratic mandate until 1984.’317 Hansen 
concludes that Nicaragua’s obvious deviation from the conception of transitional justice as a 
response to transitions from authoritarian to democratizing states accounts for the rare analysis 
of transitional justice in the field.318  
Hansen’s consideration of revolutionary Nicaragua as a possible exercise in transitional justice 
is an important break from the case’s previous exclusion. However, his analysis is limited to 
consideration of CPR to the neglect of considering revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiatives to 
advance ESR and redress structural violence and social inequality as a form of transitional 
justice. As a result, Hansen’s success in overturning an early paradigm of transitional justice is 
disappointed by his adherence to a different obstacle – the focus on CPR.  
Finally, the most comprehensive work on Nicaragua in transitional justice literature may well 
be Bothmann’s Transitional Justice in Nicaragua, 1990-2012: Drawing a Line in the Past. 
While the purpose of her work was to explore the causes behind the lack of transitional justice 
in Nicaragua from 1990 to 2012, the period from 1979 to 1990 also receives attention. Using a 
definition of transitional justice as ‘a set of judicial and non-judicial measures to redress the 
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legacies of authoritarian rule and past human rights violations’,319 comprised of judicial 
prosecutions, amnesties, truth commissions, lustration, and reparations, Bothmann considered 
whether revolutionary Nicaragua pursued transitional justice. While considering that judicial 
prosecutions of National Guardsmen and Somoza supporters could constitute transitional 
justice measures, Bothmann dismissed these as ‘political trials and not human rights trials for 
their disregard for due process principles’, and therefore ‘highly problematic to treat them as 
TJ instruments’.320 Therefore, aside from engaging in ‘victor’s justice’ and revenge killings, 
Bothmann concluded that there were no attempts to deal with the past through transitional 
justice in revolutionary Nicaragua.321 
Bothmann briefly engages with the topic of social inequality in the context of revolutionary 
Nicaragua. While recognising the ‘promise of raising the standard of living of the broad 
masses’ and ‘serious efforts to reduce existing socio-economic inequalities’, and related 
successes in literacy, education, and health, these are only discussed as a matter of historical 
context.322 Bothmann fails to consider revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiatives to address social 
inequality as a form of transitional justice, likely because of a narrow or traditional 
understanding of the concept and the mechanisms that advance it. 
Notably absent from her overview of the transitional justice field is any acknowledgment of 
the ongoing debate regarding the field’s prioritization of CPR and the demand for the inclusion 
of ESR.323 This confirms Bothmann’s adherence to a traditional understanding of transitional 
justice whose prioritization of CPR over ESR does not allow for the consideration of 
revolutionary Nicaragua’s efforts to redress social inequality as a case of transitional justice. 
While conceding that ‘between 1979 and 1990 Nicaragua fundamentally changed’, Bothmann 
stops short of considering this fundamental change as the result of attempts to deal with the 
past through transitional justice.324  
As demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three, despite a broadening of the field of transitional 
justice field, attempts to include ESR have been limited by persistent traditional understandings 
of transitional justice that exclude consideration of structural violence and social inequality as 
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transitional justice issues. The scholars discussed above adopt such traditional understandings, 
and as a result have failed to recognise revolutionary Nicaragua’s efforts to redress structural 
violence and social inequality as a practice of transitional justice, thereby missing an important 
learning opportunity. This missed opportunity is an error this Chapter hopes to rectify.  
4.1.2 Background  
To best appreciate revolutionary Nicaragua’s transitional justice project it is necessary to 
understand what Nicaragua was transitioning from. Utilizing the World Bank’s definition of 
absolute poverty as ‘a condition of life so limited by malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, low life 
expectancy, and high infant mortality rate as to be beneath any rational definition of human 
decency’,325 a 1981 report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded 
that approximately half the population in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua lived in absolute 
poverty.326 An earlier study conducted in 1970 indicated that 5 percent of the population 
received 28 percent of the national income, while 50 percent of the population received only 
15 percent of the income.327  
The cause behind this dire state of poverty was the Somoza family – ‘the greatest obstacle to 
improving the quality of life of most of the Nicaraguan population’328 – who ruled over 
Nicaragua between father Anastasio Somoza García and sons Luis Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
and Anastasio Somoza Debayle from 1936 to 1979.329 During their rule, the Somoza family 
and close associates amassed considerable personal wealth at the expense of the rest of the 
country.330 Central to their power was the Somoza family’s control over the National Guard, a 
national military force, who served as a de facto private security force for the Somozas and 
their interests, and has been described as ‘key to maintaining [the] system of exaggerated social 
and economic inequality’.331 The National Guard has been attributed with several human rights 
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violations under Somoza rule, with torture and murder widely practiced in rural 
communities.332 
Largely a response to the poor conditions suffered by Nicaraguans, the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front or FSLN) was founded in 1961 in 
opposition to Somocist rule. Their significant role in the Nicaraguan Revolution, which saw 
the deposition of President Anastasio Somoza and the end of Somoza rule in July 1979, was 
followed by their control over the government until their formal election in 1984. The 
Nicaraguan Revolution or the ‘War of Liberation’ of 1978 to 1979 was the ‘product of systemic 
socioeconomic factors [and] intense political opposition to a particularly venal dictator.’333 In 
the first few months of conflict, the National Guard was attributed with the indiscriminate use 
of artillery bombardment resulting in deaths and injuries among the civilian population,334 
military operations resulting in summary execution of civilians on the basis of living in areas 
where the FSLN was active,335 and the disappearance of hundreds among the rural peasantry.336 
As the revolutionary government came into power, Nicaragua entered a period of transition 
where the injustices of Somocist rule and the National Guard could be redressed, and a different 
path for the country could be embarked on. The successful revolution ushered in a period where 
‘[m]ost Nicaraguans saw […] an opportunity to create a system free of the political, social, and 
economic inequalities of the almost universally hated Somoza regime.’337 
The optimism that followed the Sandinista Revolution was not shared by all, including a 
powerful and influential actor in the region. Remarking on the situation in Latin America, 
President Ronald Reagan described the region as divided between ‘the positive opportunity 
[…] illustrated by the two-thirds of the nations in the area which have democratic 
governments’, and the ‘dark future […] foreshadowed by the […] tightening grip of the 
totalitarian left’, including in revolutionary Nicaragua.338 For the United States of America, a 
successful socialist revolution in Central America with ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union posed 
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a threat to stability in the region, to national security, and to their ideological interests during 
the Cold War.339 In response, the United States staged a campaign of economic strain, support 
for counterrevolutionary covert operations, and propaganda in order to undermine and discredit 
the revolutionary government.340 
For the purposes of this discussion, it is prudent to distinguish between two distinct time 
periods: pre-revolutionary Nicaragua from 1967 to July 1979 and revolutionary Nicaragua 
from July 1979 to the end of 1982. Between 1967 to July 1979, Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
began his first term as President and dictator until his flight from Nicaragua following the 
successful revolution. The July 1979 to end of 1982 period begins with the coming to power 
of the revolutionary government. While the revolutionary government maintained power until 
1990, the outbreak of the US-sponsored Contra-Revolutionary War ‘effectively [brought] all 
social programs under siege’, as ‘the full development of the Reagan administration’s policy 
of low-intensity conflict’ came to fruition by the end of 1982.341 One scholar described the 
situation rather bleakly:  
The period from 1983 to 1987 involved a deteriorating economy, mobilization for defense, 
and massive destruction wrought by the contra, especially in the rural areas. With defense 
needs consuming up to 50% of the national budget, and financial hardship induced by an 
economic blockade as well as the decrease in international aid, many of the institutional 
changes initiated in the previous years had to be scaled back, or stalled completely.342 
It is important to emphasize the disruption caused by the renewed outbreak of conflict in order 
to recognise a limitation of revolutionary Nicaragua as a potential case study. The Contra-
Revolutionary War and the wartime economy that was developed in response, economic 
sanctions from the United States, and an already poor economy recently aggravated by the 
revolution had a profoundly negative impact on the country’s economy and social programs in 
particular, including the programs in health, housing. and educational services discussed 
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below.343 The negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programs from the 1990s onwards 
further distance the situation in Nicaragua from the programs instituted during Revolutionary 
period.344 Aside from being outside of the scope of this dissertation, determining the efficacy 
and long-term impact of the revolutionary government’s initiatives in redressing in social 
inequality would be challenging, if not impossible. Nonetheless, as the following sections will 
demonstrate, by comparing social conditions prior to and after the revolution it is possible to 
determine the short-term success of these programs and their potential for redressing the most 
severe forms of absolute poverty and social inequality as a matter of transitional justice. 
Recalling the political roots of transitional justice in a Western agenda of promoting liberal 
democracies, it is clear that the reason behind revolutionary Nicaragua’s initial exclusion as an 
example of transitional justice is the same reason for which it was subjected to an aggressive 
campaign by the US:  the aspirations of the Sandinista Revolution were antithetical to these 
Western goals.  As Carlos Chamorro, former editor of the Sandinista newspaper La Barricada, 
commented on Sandinista rule: ‘[d]emocracy was important but more important than 
democracy was social justice.’345 Having recognised these political roots and with a broadened 
understanding of transitional justice in mind, this Chapter will show that revolutionary 
Nicaragua’s attempts to address a legacy of injustice including structural violence, social 
inequality, and direct violence should be considered a form of transitional justice. 
4.1.3 Basic Needs and Structural Violence 
As will be shown, revolutionary Nicaragua’s efforts to redress the injustices of the past were 
motivated in large part by social and distributive justice. This is most evident through their 
programs aimed at securing the basic needs of Nicaraguan people. Securing basic needs or 
basic social rights is widely discussed in transitional justice literature, including as a matter of 
securing human development or freedoms,346 promoting substantive social justice,347 
redressing structural violence,348 and as a necessary and fundamental step to the transitional 
                                                 
343 For further discussion on the effects of the Contra-Revolutionary War, see also Richard M. Garfield and E. 
Taboada, "Health Services Reforms in Revolutionary Nicaragua," American Journal of Public Health 74, no. 10 
(October 1984): 1143-44 (health). 
344 Marie Hamlyn Zuniga, Carmel Borg, and Peter Mayo, "Nicaragua: Past and Present," Public Intellectuals, 
Radical Democracy and Social Movements A Book of Interviews 276 (2007): 17. 
345 Chamorro, Carlos. Interview by Brian Gruber. The Digital Home of Brian Gruber. October 8, 2014. 
346 McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 429, citing Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 2001. 
347 Cahill-Ripley, “Foregrounding Socio-Economic Rights in Transitional Justice,” 189. 
348 See for example, Mcgill, "Different Violence, Different Justice?,” 81-82. 
63 
 
justice project itself.349 Central to this are issues of securing water, food, health, decent housing, 
education, and social security. Securing basic needs are a direct intervention towards redressing 
structural violence, and in the case of uneven distribution between communities, social 
inequality. In his discussion on structural violence, Galtung specifically discusses the uneven 
distribution of health services, education and literacy, and housing conditions as examples of 
such violence.350  
For the purposes of the current discussion, focusing attention on the poor conditions of health, 
education, and housing in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua allows certain characteristics to become 
apparent, namely that there existed a state of absolute poverty and that the distribution of wealth 
and social services specifically disadvantaged the 55 percent of Nicaraguans who lived in rural 
areas.351 Nicaraguans that suffered under this absolute poverty fell victim to systemic and 
structural violence which further translated into social inequality, as rural communities and the 
urban poor suffered the most from the uneven distribution of services and resources. It should 
be noted that these weren’t the only efforts to address social inequality, however, as the 
revolutionary government addressed the effects of social inequality in other areas as well. In 
addition to these initiatives, similar efforts were made in the areas of gender equality, food 
distribution, land redistribution, and social security – areas for improvement also identified in 
their 1969 Historic Program.352 While not addressed in this discussion, these experiences also 
stand to benefit from further study if transitional justice is to address structural violence and 
social inequality. Nonetheless, the steps taken in the areas of health, education and housing 
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will demonstrate revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiative to redress the structural violence and 
inequality. 
4.2 Structural Violence and Social Inequality in Nicaragua (1969 to 1979) 
4.2.1 Health 
The health system under Somoza has been characterized as ‘disorganized [and] inefficient’, 
and accessible primarily to urban elites.353 With health facilities and personnel concentrated in 
urban areas, health care was not readily accessible to rural communities.354 Furthermore, 
matters of public health and sanitation were left unattended, including  limited access to potable 
water in urban (41.8 percent)  and rural (10.9 percent) areas, limited access to sewage or septic 
tanks in urban areas (29.4 percent), and over three quarters of a million people in rural areas 
without latrines.355 In 1970, gastroenteritis and other diarrhoea diseases were the leading cause 
of death, constituting 23.6 percent of all deaths.356 The social costs of the poor health, public 
health, and sanitation system under Somoza was apparent in Nicaragua’s strikingly low life 
expectancy of an estimated 53 years and high infant mortality rate of 120 to 146 per 1,000 live 
births, compared to neighbouring Costa Rica’s 70 years and 29 per 1,000, respectively.357 
Despite poor health conditions, military spending surpassed health three-fold in 1976.358  
4.2.2 Education/Literacy 
Anastasio Somoza, the father, is infamously quoted for saying: ‘I don’t want educated people. 
I want oxen.’359 This sentiment was clearly put into practice during the rule of father and sons, 
with education in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua characterized as ‘poor’360 and a non-priority 
under the Somozas.361 The consequences were apparent in the distribution and accessibility of 
schools, school attendance and dropout rates, and high levels of illiteracy. Schools were 
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concentrated in urban areas, restricting access primarily to the middle and upper classes,362 
with children of wealthy families enjoying access to better schools through exclusive private 
schools.363 Of the high school age group only 17.5 percent enrolled in secondary school, and 
of the university age group only 8.4 percent attended post-secondary institutions.364 Comparing 
the dropout rates of primary school goers further exposes a divide between urban and rural 
areas: only 5 percent of rural primary school goers finished primary once started, compared to 
44 percent of urban children.365 While pre-revolutionary Nicaragua had high rates of 50366 to 
52 percent367 illiteracy, these rates belie the true consequences of unequal distribution of 
schools between urban and rural areas. Illiteracy reached approximately 70 percent in rural 
areas, compared to 20.4 percent in urban areas.368 
4.2.3 Housing  
The housing situation in Managua has been characterized as ‘serious’369 and ‘disastrous’370 
even prior to a 1972 earthquake, which left in its wake 10,000 dead, 20,000 injured, and three-
quarters of residents homeless.371 A 1972 study concluded that 73.7 percent of housing was 
‘inadequate’,372 with reconstruction efforts after the earthquake doing little to alleviate the 
situation, and most housing built for middle- and upper-class families.373 Despite the disaster 
caused by the earthquake, Somoza and other government elites allegedly seized the opportunity 
for self-enrichment, using half of 32 million dollars of disaster relief sent by the US for personal 
gain.374 The already poor housing situation was further exasperated by the revolutionary war, 
which the Ministry of Housing and Human Settlements estimated caused a total of 38 million 
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dollars-worth of damage to housing.375 At the time of their taking the reins of power in 
Nicaragua, the revolutionary government inherited a shortage of between 250,000 and 500,000 
units of housing.376 
4.3 Redressing Structural Violence and Social Inequality in Revolutionary Nicaragua (1979 
to 1982) 
Where pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was characterized by a state of absolute poverty and social 
inequality, revolutionary Nicaragua saw ‘tremendous progress […] in meeting the needs of the 
masses’, with accomplishments in health, education, housing, and welfare specifically 
recognised.377 These improvements were not a product of chance, but rather the product of 
‘conscious, flexible, and pragmatic planning on the part of the government and of mobilization 
involvement and commitment on the part of the people.’378 The Historic Program of the FSLN, 
originally printed in 1969 and reprinted June 1981, affirmed the party’s goal of ‘establishing a 
social system that wipes out the exploitation and poverty that [Nicaraguan] people have been 
subjected to’.379 Furthermore, in the ‘first public document of the revolutionary government’, 
the government pledged to develop policies that would improve quality of life for all 
Nicaraguans, including in the areas of health, education, welfare, and housing conditions.380 
Whereas the previous section looked at poor conditions of health, education, and housing in 
pre-revolutionary Nicaragua as indicators of structural violence and social inequality that 
disadvantaged rural communities, this section turns to revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiatives 
aimed at improving those conditions. During this section, two characteristics of revolutionary 
Nicaragua will be made apparent: firstly, their programs and campaigns specifically sought to 
alleviate absolute poverty and secondly, resources and services were increasingly distributed 
towards previously underserved rural areas. While this overview primarily covers the period 
from the beginning of revolutionary Nicaragua in July 1979 to the end of 1982, a few 
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exceptions will be made to compare between conditions prior to and after the revolution, and 
to demonstrate the success of these programs.381  
4.3.1 Health 
The first efforts of the revolutionary government in the area of health were put towards creating 
a National Unified Health System and the restoration of pre-war health facilities. While an 
improvement, an initial significant increase in available health facilities and trained health 
personnel of all levels in urban areas left the imbalance of services between urban and rural 
areas unchanged.382 Government health care was made accessible to all Nicaraguans, which 
increased utilization of health facilities by the masses, and ‘greatly increased expectations in 
underserved areas.’383 
From 1981 to the end of 1982, the Ministry of Health ‘received top priority among the social 
sector ministries.’384 Construction of four new regional hospitals began, and the number of 
health posts increased by over 25 percent, primarily in rural or underserved urban areas. There 
was an additional increase in medical personnel, and a 20 percent increase in the number of 
consultations. This period has been characterized as a ‘shift from a concentration of resources 
and services in urban areas to a dispersion toward underserved (primarily rural areas).’385  By 
1984, ten new hospitals and 300 health centres had been constructed, and in that year six 
million consultations had been conducted, a staggering increase from 200,000 in 1977.386 
Aside from improvements in the number of health personnel and health facilities, the 
revolutionary government also initiated a series of health campaigns. National inoculation 
campaigns were responsible for effective elimination of polio and diphtheria,387 and the 
reduction of measles, tetanus, tuberculosis, and whooping cough.388 These campaigns were 
made possible through ‘massive short-term training courses and a heavy dose of public health 
education’, and depended on the mobilization of up to 10 percent of population as health 
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volunteers.389 These campaigns also had positive long-term effects in promoting the formation 
of community health councils at the local, regional, and national level.390 Other initiatives 
included the expansion of an oral rehydration program and the opening of 300 centres, a ‘major 
factor in the significant (30 percent) reduction of infant mortality’,391 sanitation initiatives 
involving garbage removal and latrine construction, and a 1981 anti-malaria campaign 
involving 73,000 health brigadistas.392  
The success of the revolutionary Government’s initiatives in improving health conditions was 
evident as early as 1984: 
It is estimated that, between 1978 and 1983, infant mortality decreased from 121 to 80.2 
per 1,000 live births, life expectancy at birth rose from 52 to 59 years. The number of 
reported malaria cases has decreased by 50 per cent, polio cases have not been reported for 
two years, no measles cases were reported in the first half of 1984, and most other 
immunization preventable diseases are considerably reduced. Diarrhoea has fallen from the 
first to the fourth most common cause of hospital mortality.393 
4.3.2 Education / Literacy 
Immediately following the revolution, the first steps taken in the area of education were repairs 
to war-damaged schools (47 of 128 war damaged schools were repaired) and the construction 
of new schools. Community projects accounted for the majority of new schools built (85 
percent of 739 schools in the first two years), with most located in rural areas.394 From 1981 
onwards, the Ministry of Education expanded both physical structures and student enrolment, 
building three times as many schools in the 1981 to 1982 period than the July 1979 to 1981 
period, with a focus on underserved rural areas and areas of the interior.395 By 1982, the number 
of teachers grew from 12,975 under Somoza to over 40,000.396 
The Ministry of Education’s ‘most ambitious and well-known effort’ and recipient of a 
UNESCO award for its contribution to literacy was the Literacy Crusade.397 Motivated by a 
sense of ‘justice and moral obligation of the revolution towards the population’ and considered 
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necessary for forthcoming national reconstruction,398 the Literacy Crusade saw the 
mobilization of 80,000 to 100,000 volunteers over five months in a nationwide adult literacy 
campaign.399 The efforts of the Crusade were met with great success, reporting a reduction in 
illiteracy to less than 13 percent compared to pre-revolutionary rates of 50 to 52 percent.400 The 
Crusade was especially effective in rural communities, with an 87 percent reduction in 
illiteracy reported in some areas.401 Expanding on the success of the Crusade, over 150,000 
adults participated in adult education programs through Basic Popular Education Centres 
thereafter.402 
Nicaragua’s Literacy Campaign offers important lessons for the transitional justice field. Not 
only did it contribute to a ‘social transformation process aiming at the redistribution of power 
and wealth’403 by advancing the right to education and redressing social inequality through 
advancing literacy in previously marginalized areas, it further demonstrates a possible means 
of promoting reconciliation through constructive engagement between previously 
disconnected communities. Beyond its ambition for eradicating illiteracy, the literacy 
campaign was also motivated by other goals, including encouraging ‘integration and 
understanding between Nicaraguans of different classes and backgrounds’ and ‘support[ing] 
national cohesion and consensus’.404 The campaign served to bridge a gap between urban and 
rural areas and demonstrated to marginalized Nicaraguans that they would begin to be included 
in the distribution of wealth and services.405  
4.3.3 Housing 
To rectify the housing situation, the revolutionary Government instituted several direct 
intervention programs, including mass housing projects or housing estates, self-help programs 
and building materials banks, progressive urbanization programmes, and settlement 
upgrading.406 
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Through housing projects and housing estates programs, the government facilitated the 
construction of 9,536 homes between 1980 and 1986 through direct labour until the program’s 
termination as a result of the war economy.407 While most of the initial construction occurred 
in Managua, from 1981 ‘a shift began toward underserved areas of the interior.’408 From a 
short-term perspective, the period from July 1979 to the end of 1980 saw the construction of 
1,146 new houses and repairs to 4,676 war-damaged houses, and a five-fold increase from 1981 
to 1982 with 5,726 new homes built.409  
While there was a shift towards facilitating housing for the poor, the newly established Ministry 
of Housing and Human Settlements (MINVAH) faced financial constraints and was unable to 
provide even low-cost housing for all those that needed it. As a solution to these constraints, 
the MINVAH implemented a Materials Bank program, which produced and distributed 
housing materials for purchase at low cost and with low-interest financing.410 The Materials 
Bank program addressed housing needs in rural communities in particular, with 95 percent of 
its resources distributed to the benefit of the rural population.411 The capacity of the program 
was reduced following the destruction of an important saw mill during the Contra-
revolutionary war, and the quality of services provided were similarly reduced to meet urgent 
wartime needs.412 Another solution was the progressive urbanizations programme, ‘a sites and 
services program provid[ing] low-cost controlled development (primarily in the urban 
centres).’413 This program was introduced following a flood in 1982, and provided basic 
infrastructure to the recently homeless. 
Initiatives to improve the housing situation went beyond direct intervention in the form of 
housing production. The revolutionary government also took steps to expropriate land 
containing shanty towns and vacant urban land. Land containing 420 shanty towns was 
expropriated and placed under the ownership of MINVAH, who in turn reinvested income from 
rent into necessary services and infrastructure before ceding ownership to its occupants.414 
Vacant urban land, previously protected by private ownership rights, was expropriated for the 
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purposes of public interest development, including housing.415 Other indirect intervention 
methods included the reduction of rent by 40 to 50 percent to the benefit of nearly 72,000 poor 
families, and legal provision for the right of rental tenants to claim ownership of properties 
after a maximum period of 20 years.416 
4.4 Accountability for Human Rights Violations Perpetrated by the National Guard  
Revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiatives to redress poverty and social inequality were not the sole 
focus of their justice efforts during the transition. As previously mentioned, the National Guard 
perpetrated various human rights violations during the revolutionary war and under Somoza 
rule. Following the success of the revolution and with around 7,000 Guardsmen in custody, 
there was ‘widespread desire among the Nicaraguan people to castigate [the] detested [National 
Guard].’417 Demands for justice took an ugly turn with over a hundred National Guardsmen 
summarily executed in the first few days of the successful revolution, albeit without 
government sanction and drawing strong condemnation from the newly appointed Minister of 
Interior.418 While not a formal act of the revolutionary government, their failure to prevent such 
atrocity is a testament to the importance of rule of law standards during transitionary periods. 
Formal prosecutions took place thereafter in the form of Special Tribunals and Appellate 
Courts, whose jurisdiction extended over members of the National Guard, public officials, and 
other civilians associated with the Somocist regime.419 However, the revolutionary 
government’s attempt at meting out criminal justice was marred by concerns over lack of fair 
trials, scope of jurisdiction, restricted access to legal assistance, poor appeal proceedings, poor 
standards regarding evidence, political imprisonment, and arbitrary detention.420 These 
concerns led Bothmann to observe that prosecutions under the Special Tribunals were ‘political 
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trials and not human rights trials due to their disregard for due process principles’, and to 
conclude this as an exercise of victor’s justice.421  
While not constituting the primary focus of their justice project, the revolutionary 
government’s attempt at criminal justice was undoubtedly problematic from a legal and human 
rights perspective. It should be recalled, however, that the fledgling government did not benefit 
from the resources, experience, and expertise offered by the international community as was 
the case in other countries undertaking transitional justice projects. Despite its failure, the 
attempt to hold National Guardsmen and others associated with the Somoza regime to account 
demonstrated a desire to address the injustices of the past through criminal justice, and should 
be considered, albeit a problematic one, a part of Nicaragua’s transitional justice project. 
4.5 Lessons Learnt – Transitional Justice in Revolutionary Nicaragua 
Revolutionary Nicaragua’s efforts to redress the injustices of its past should be considered 
against the understanding of transitional justice and its key components as identified in Chapter 
Two. Furthermore, it is also important to consider how revolutionary Nicaragua was able to 
overcome practical challenges to addressing structural violence during a time of transition. 
4.5.1 Transitional Justice and Revolutionary Nicaragua’s Justice Efforts 
In Chapter Two, it was proposed that transitional justice as a concept can broadly be understood 
as the pursuit of justice during a period of social or political transition in order to address past 
injustices and to work towards certain aspirations for the future. This understanding allows 
consideration of the transitional justice potential of revolutionary Nicaragua’s experiences 
from a depoliticised understanding of the concept. As addressed above, if a traditional 
understanding is taken or if the case of revolutionary Nicaragua’s justice efforts is weighed 
against a traditional conception of transitional justice, their experiences would be quickly 
dismissed, along with valuable lessons on how transitional justice can address different justice 
demands. 
In order to consider their experiences as transitional justice, this section will consider 
revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiatives to address the past against the key components of the 
concept. While these key components are not easily separable and have a dynamic relationship 
and influence over one another, by identifying their backwards- and forwards-looking 
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considerations, their understanding of justice, and the mechanisms used, it is possible to 
develop an understanding of the conception of transitional justice held by the revolutionary 
government. 
Justice 
Comparing the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary periods, Suzanne Baker characterized the 
former as ‘one of great disparities and inequalities, or one of great social injustice’, and the 
latter as ‘attempting to promote, and even achieve, social justice.’422 Motivated by a sense of 
social justice, the revolutionary government quickly took steps to secure the basic needs of the 
population. However, their efforts went beyond simply redressing conditions of absolute 
poverty as a matter of social justice. Emphasis was placed on providing resources and services 
to previously marginalized communities in an attempt to promote substantive equality between 
the rural and urban communities. This suggests the revolutionary government was motivated 
by a sense of distributive justice in addition to social justice.  
Finally, while the social and distributive forms of justice constitute the main focus of this 
paper’s attention, it is important to recognise revolutionary Nicaragua’s attempts to address the 
past through criminal justice and trials and prosecutions of National Guardsmen and Somocists. 
Serious flaws rendered these attempts akin to Bothmann’s conclusion that they were an 
exercise of ‘victor’s justice’, not transitional justice. Nonetheless, these attempts at criminal 
justice demonstrated a concerted effort of the revolutionary government to address the 
injustices of the past and were part and parcel of steps taken to secure justice during transition. 
A thorough consideration of revolutionary Nicaragua’s attempts to address the past as a 
potential example of transitional justice should address both their successes in advancing social 
and distributive justice, and their failures in criminal justice. 
 The focus on social, distributive, and criminal justice demonstrates the prevalence and 
interrelated nature of direct and structural violence under Somoza. The National Guard was 
instrumental in maintaining an unjust structure in Nicaraguan society and was heavy-handed 
in their conduct. Nicaraguan Minister of Interior Tomás Borge expressed this duality quite 
concisely in describing the National Guardsmen: ‘besides being murderers they were thieves. 
Besides being robbers, they were brutal. They killed a lot of Nicaraguans, and they stole the 
                                                 
422 Baker, “Aiming for Social Justice,” 5, 10. 
74 
 
property of others.’423 From a justice perspective, both CPR and ESR violations, including 
structural violence, had to be addressed as a matter of social, distributive, and criminal justice. 
Backwards- and Forwards-Looking Considerations 
The focus on social justice, distributive justice, and criminal justice in turn informed the 
backwards- and forwards-looking considerations of Nicaragua’s transitional justice project, or 
those injustices that were addressed during the transition. Through programs aimed at 
improving conditions in health, education, and housing for the urban and rural poor, the 
revolutionary government tackled the injustice of structural violence, namely poverty and 
social inequality. These considerations were identified earlier in the Historic Program of FSLN. 
In the program, the FSLN clearly outlined their mandate as the establishment of a ‘social 
system that wipes out the exploitation and poverty that [Nicaraguans] have been subjected to 
in past history’. In this way, the backwards- and forwards-looking considerations work 
together. Broadly speaking, revolutionary Nicaragua’s transitional justice project was aimed at 
addressing past issues of social injustice in order to ensure the future of the country would be 
characterized by its absence, or social justice. 
Mechanisms 
Finally, revolutionary Nicaragua depended on certain mechanisms to advance social, 
distributive and criminal justice, to address past injustices of direct and structural violence, and 
to advance a society characterized by social justice and equality.  Similar to traditional 
conceptions of transitional justice, demands for criminal justice and accountability for the 
wrongdoings of Somocists and National Guardsmen were pursued through trials and 
prosecution through the Special Tribunals and Appellate Courts. On the other hand, with 
demands for redressing a legacy of structural violence and social inequality as matters of social 
and distributive justice, the choice in mechanisms diverged greatly from traditional transitional 
justice and hardly resembled the toolkit associated with it. Some mechanisms employed in 
revolutionary Nicaragua have already been proposed by transitional justice scholars for their 
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potential for redressing ESRV, structural violence, and social inequality, including the 
redistribution of land and provision for social justice through constitutional and civil law.424  
Aside from these initiatives, however, the revolutionary government depended on mechanisms 
that do not appear in any proposed transitional justice toolkits, relying instead on short-term 
campaigns facilitated by the mass mobilization of public participants to improve literacy, 
education, and health. Many of these programs did more than address issues of poverty and 
inequality, also serving to bridge gaps between previously distanced communities, 
demonstrating a potential to advance the goal of reconciliation.   
Having identified these key components, it is clear that revolutionary Nicaragua justice efforts 
can be considered a conception of transitional justice that was motivated by social and 
distributive justice, and addressed past and ongoing poverty and social inequality through 
short-term campaigns facilitated by mass mobilization of public participants in order to secure 
social equality and adequate standard of living. While distinctly different from its traditional 
conception, revolutionary Nicaragua tackled the injustices of their past in a manner no less a 
form transitional justice. 
4.5.2 In the Face of Practical Challenges  
The case of revolutionary Nicaragua also offers valuable lessons regarding the practical 
challenges raised regarding the potential for transitional justice to redress structural violence, 
namely that transitional justice is ill-suited for such long-terms projects, and that severe 
resource constraints will limit such potential.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, addressing CPR and ESR concerns are not exclusively short-
term or long-term matters. Securing social equality and eradicating structural violence through 
transitional justice will not be accomplished in the short-term, but, as in the case of 
revolutionary Nicaragua, can lay a foundation through small, symbolic, and real advances. 
Through their programs in health, housing and education the revolutionary government did not 
rid Nicaragua of all forms of structural violence outright. Rather, through short-term projects 
with success in securing basic needs in previously marginalized areas, they laid a foundation 
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for long-term development, and signalled to previously marginalized communities their 
inclusion in the future of the country and the government’s intention to rectify the structural 
violence and social inequality of the past. 
The revolutionary government’s initiatives were also able to achieve success in the face of 
severe resource constraints. In response to such constraints, the revolutionary government 
depended on the mass mobilization of public participants to make substantial advances in the 
areas of health and education. The success of the Literacy Campaign, for example, was heavily 
dependent on volunteer educators and private and international donors and was intentionally 
run as a short-term project to be economically feasible.425 The revolutionary government also 
focused on the most severe conditions of absolute poverty and social inequality. In addressing 
poor housing conditions, for example, sites and services programs focused on providing basic 
infrastructure for the homeless, foregoing attempts at providing better and costlier 
infrastructure. The Materials Banks program was another creative response to resource 
constraints. By providing building materials at subsidized cost and with low-interest loans, the 
revolutionary government was able to empower its citizens to better their housing conditions 
despite resource constraints. 
Overall, an emphasis on securing basic needs and meeting the most fundamental ESR allowed 
revolutionary Nicaragua to address structural violence despite resource constraints. This 
approach is discussed by Szoke-Burke, who states that in the face of resource constraints, 
‘[g]overnments can strategically sequence different processes aimed at remedying ESR 
violations so that they occur at a time where such redress or fulfilment is plausible’.426 The 
case of revolutionary Nicaragua provides a rebuttal to opponents of the inclusion of structural 
violence within transitional justice’s remit on the basis of resource constraints. It also sheds 
light on the differentiation between transitional justice and development, and how these may 
work together. By trying to secure the most basic needs of its citizens and by addressing 
structural violence and inequality as a matter of transitional justice, revolutionary Nicaragua 
demonstrated a clear break between the injustices of the past and goals for the future of the 
country. This first step of transitional justice, however, should be built upon in the long-term 
and as a matter of development to ensure these goals materialize. 
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4.6 Chapter Conclusion 
As this Chapter demonstrated, traditional understandings of transitional justice have failed to 
consider revolutionary Nicaragua’s initiatives to redress structural violence and inequality as a 
case of transitional justice. This was largely due to a now outdated paradigm of transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy and the field’s subsequent focus on CPRV. While transitional 
justice discourse is moving towards greater inclusion of ESR within the field’s scope, persistent 
assumptions regarding transitional justice bar the inclusion of structural violence and are likely 
to further exclude revolutionary Nicaragua as a potential case. 
Civil and political rights were undermined during the Somoza family reign, and the National 
Guard was responsible for perpetrating physical violence against many Nicaraguans. While 
these injustices were addressed as a matter of criminal justice through the flawed Special 
Tribunals, this did not constitute the primary focus of revolutionary Nicaragua’s transitional 
justice project. Instead, the system of structural violence and social inequality that was created 
under 46 years of Somoza rule was the subject of their attention. Through programs and 
initiatives aimed at improving distribution of food, health, education, adequate housing, 
redistributing land and security gender equality, the revolutionary government addressed 
structural violence and social inequality as a form of transitional justice. Through these efforts, 
it is evident that revolutionary Nicaragua was working towards a transformation of Nicaraguan 
society that aimed at dismantling a system of structural violence, absolute poverty and social 
inequality.   
Considering whether this attempt at transformation is a form of transitional justice depends on 
how transitional justice and its key components are understood. If understood traditionally and 
narrowly and with a focus on criminal justice, revolutionary Nicaragua’s transitional justice 
potential would be dismissed as victor’s justice along with its flawed trials and prosecutions. 
If understood broadly, however, with social and distributive justice given equal importance 
alongside criminal justice, revolutionary Nicaragua’s attempt at transformation can be 
recognised as an important example of transitional justice that stands in sharp contrast to the 
traditional examples frequently relied upon in the discourse. 
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Chapter Five - Conclusion 
The emergence of Latin American and Eastern European countries from authoritarianism, and 
a Western agenda of promoting liberal democracy was influential in shaping the field of 
transitional justice.427 These historical and political roots determined transitional justice’s 
normative aims of promoting democracy, accountability and the rule of law, its focus on 
criminal and restorative justice and on civil and political rights, and the favoured mechanisms 
of trials, truth commissions, reparations and institutional reform. The influence of these roots 
was then consolidated as transitional justice was taken up by the highest international 
institutions and as it became a ‘global project’.428 However, the field’s rapid growth and 
consolidation also saw scholars and practitioners questioning the narrow or traditional 
understanding of transitional justice, challenging the concept itself and leaving it open to 
reconceptualization. 
Accounting for the influence of these historical and political roots and recognising transitional 
justice as an effectively contestable concept explains the lack of consensus on the concept. The 
traditional understanding of transitional justice and its assumptions about how societies in 
transition should address the past is in fact the consequence of inherent politics, namely, a 
Western liberal agenda. With growing calls for transitional justice to broaden from its 
traditional mandate and to further address issues of economic and social rights, social 
inequality, and other forms of structural violence, the concept of transitional justice finds itself 
the object of political discourse.  
It is helpful, then, to distinguish between the concept of transitional justice and its varying 
conceptions. Transitional justice as a concept can be broadly understood as the pursuit of 
justice during a period of social or political transition in order to address past injustices and to 
work towards certain aspirations for the future. Transitional justice’s varying conceptions 
distinguish themselves based on how they define the concept’s key components of justice, 
transition, and backwards- and forwards-looking considerations. By distinguishing between 
the concept and its conceptions, it is clear that the experiences of the field’s formative years 
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did not define the concept of transitional justice and how societies in transition should contend 
with the past, but rather shaped a traditional conception of transitional justice.  
While this traditional conception may have been adequate for the purposes of societies 
transitioning from a history of physical violence and civil and political rights violation, it is 
inadequate for meeting the demands of societies transitioning from social inequality and other 
forms of structural violence. In countries like South Africa or Nicaragua, social inequality and 
other forms of structural violence were injustices that characterized society before transition, 
and transitional justice’s failure to adequately address these injustices calls into question the 
‘justness’ and the ‘very objectives’ of the concept,429 undermines its aspirations for truth and 
reconciliation,430 and leaves it perpetrator instead of victim-centred.431 However, this failure is 
not attributable to the concept of transitional justice itself, but rather to the prevalence and use 
of its traditional conception in scholarship and practice. 
Distinguishing between the transitional justice concept and its conceptions is fundamental in 
answering the question that drove this dissertation: Could addressing social inequality be 
considered a form of transitional justice? On the one hand, adherence to the traditional 
conception means that ‘in any particular time and place discussion of transitional justice is 
constrained by the already existing set of tools established in other (possibly unrelated) 
transitional contexts’.432 Consequently, as long as the traditional conception is mistaken for the 
concept itself and transitional justice is persistently defined by a focus on criminal and 
restorative justice, the primary normative aims of establishing rule of law, democracy, and 
accountability, and a set of favoured mechanisms, it will be both conceptually and practically 
ill-equipped to address social inequality and other forms of structural violence. On the other 
hand, if the traditional conception is recognised as one of potentially many conceptions of 
transitional justice, then social inequality and structural violence can be addressed through a 
conception of transitional justice that places a primary focus on social or distributive justice 
and turns to alternative mechanisms to redress such issues. 
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Recognising the potential for social inequality to be addressed as a form or conception of 
transitional justice does not demand that these issues always be addressed. To borrow Sharp’s 
words, including structural violence within transitional justice ‘might not always be necessary, 
or even desirable.’433 In transitional contexts characterized by a history of physical violence, 
criminal or restorative justice initiatives may be better suited to address demands for justice. 
However, where such contexts are characterized by a history of social inequality or other forms 
of structural violence, transitional justice should be conceptually flexible enough to allow these 
injustices to be addressed as a matter of social or distributive justice, and through alternative 
and better suited mechanisms. By distinguishing between the transitional justice concept and 
its varying conceptions, the question of how transitional societies define justice and transition, 
what past injustices should be addressed and what aspirations for the future should be pursued 
is left open to determination by context specific needs and demands.  
This understanding also allows historical examples of societies in transition to be revisited and 
considered as potential examples of transitional justice, especially where they were previously 
dismissed by assumptions of the traditional conception. In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were part 
of a ‘groundswell of forces seeking social justice [that] inspired the 1978–1979 War of 
Liberation, toppling the Somoza Regime’.434 The revolutionary government committed 
themselves to addressing economic and social concerns during transition,435 including securing 
basic needs such as health, education, and housing, and further aiming to secure social services, 
land redistribution, and gender equality.436 Historian Harvey Williams specifically recognised 
accomplishments in health, education, housing, and welfare, finding that achievements in these 
areas ‘were the result of a combination of conscious, flexible, and pragmatic planning on the 
part of the government and of mobilization involvement and commitment on the part of the 
people’, and  with these efforts ‘reach[ing] and involve[ing] the vast majority of the previously 
underserved poor’.437 These accomplishments were achieved despite several practical 
challenges, including the resource constraints of an already poor economy aggravated by 
malicious US intervention.438 
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While not cast in such terms at the time, and while starkly different from the traditional 
conception, revolutionary Nicaragua’s efforts to address a history of structural violence and 
the most severe forms of social inequality should be considered a conception of transitional 
justice primarily motivated by social and distributive justice. Had a traditional understanding 
of transitional justice been taken, thereby closing the door for political discourse on the highly 
debatable and effectively contestable concept, revolutionary Nicaragua’s experiences and 
potential lessons for the field would be too readily dismissed.   
At the time of writing, Nicaragua is experiencing protests and crackdowns by pro-government 
groups and security forces that has resulted in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries.439 
A recently established Truth, Justice, and Peace Commission has a mandate to investigate the 
violence and deaths that resulted from clashes between the protesters and security forces.440 At 
the helm of the repressive government crackdown sits the FSLN – the very subject of this 
discussion’s praise for their earlier efforts in addressing structural violence. While tracing the 
events from the early 1980s to the present day is beyond the scope of this dissertation, an 
important observation should be made: as the newly established commission addresses the 
direct violence, what consideration will be given to the concerns that sparked the protests?  
On April 16, 2018, university students in Nicaragua’s capital of Managua demonstrated against 
the government’s inadequate response to forest fires in a protected reserve. Demonstrations 
escalated two days later following the introduction of social security reforms that decreased 
pensions and social security while increasing incomes and payroll taxes, paving the way for 
the government crackdown that followed.441 Will the newly established Truth, Justice and 
Peace Commission maintain the traditional focus on direct violence, or will it also address the 
economic and social concerns at the root of the demonstrations?  
If transitional justice is to adequately address the concerns and demands of the different 
societies it hopes to benefit, it should shed the leftover political assumptions that are imbedded 
in the traditional conception of transitional justice. Only then can the justice, transition, 
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backwards- and forwards-looking considerations and choice in mechanisms of transitional 
justice be appropriately defined by context specifics. Whether addressing civil and political 
rights violations through criminal or restorative justice, or addressing economic and social 
rights violations, social inequality or other forms of structural violence through social or 
distributive justice, the concept of transitional justice should be understood broadly enough so 
as not to close the door on societies who may employ it differently.   
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